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JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTIONS: MODERNITY, 
ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION, AND THE 
URBAN POOR IN INDIA 
Priya S. Gupta* 
ABSTRACT 
Comparative legal research in property and urban planning law has 
taken an increasing interest in the policy patterns and legal arguments 
that municipal bodies and courts employ in the implementation of 
often radical urban reconfiguration.  Aided by geographers, 
sociologists, and political economists, comparative property law 
scholars have begun to unearth the justificatory frameworks that 
underlie and shape these changes in metropolitan urban landscapes 
and that reveal an interplay between tangible and immediate modes 
of political constituencies’ interest navigation on the one hand, and 
deep-seated cultural-historical motivations as well as commitments to 
transnational strategic and political loyalties, on the other.  These 
modes of research have worked to show how urban ‘local’ decision-
making is embedded in complex and entangled policy considerations, 
which are expressed through the use of economically minded 
categories such as progress, modernization, growth, and development. 
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The following Article focuses on the case of urban modernization 
policies pursued and implemented in one of the world’s largest 
metropolitan centers—India’s capital, Delhi—which is also one of the 
world’s global cities currently undergoing a radical and breathtaking 
transformation.  Embarking on a micro-analysis of the justifications 
offered in the pursuit of a ‘cleaner,’ more ‘modern,’ and ‘competitive’ 
metropolis, this Article examines a series of judgments regarding the 
rights of urban slum residents.  Particularly, the Article applies two 
analytical and conceptual lenses in studying the regulatory policies 
and the courts’ engagement with them, namely the political economy 
of development and the ideational and ideological concepts of 
‘modernity’ and ‘neoliberalism.’  The role of the judiciary in the 
allocation of property and urban space functions hereby as the site of 
engagement, the place where the regulatory fiat is approved or 
rejected, reinterpreted and reshaped, endorsed and concretized.  
Through this analysis, the Article seeks to provide a richer context for 
the way in which a number of key Indian courts, including the Indian 
Supreme Court, have become actively involved in regulatory 
municipal policies.  The Article highlights and analyzes the 
devastating effects of the recent judicial pronouncements for those 
constituencies who have long been at the margins and whose legal 
protection threatens to be further besieged and mitigated in a large-
scale shift towards economic liberalization in the name of urban 
modernization and the city’s competitive enhancement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“O Beautifiers of the City, did you not see that what was beautiful in 
Bombay was that it belonged to nobody, and to all?  Did you not see 
the everyday live-and-let-live miracles thronging its overcrowded 
streets?”1 
 
In India, in 2014, one can now access tuberculosis (TB) medicine 
from the government at no cost.  In some of the poorer areas in the 
country’s capital, Delhi, one can even get the complete and directly 
observed therapy (DOTS) treatment for TB from the local 
convenience store.2  Children can attend school without fees.  In 
Delhi, if one can afford it, one can avoid the traffic and flooding of 
                                                                                                                 
 1. SALMAN RUSHDIE, THE MOOR’S LAST SIGH 350–51 (1995). 
 2. See Our Work, OPERATION ASHA, http://www.opasha.org/our-work/ (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2014). 
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roads during monsoon season by taking the metro.  Polluted tap 
water can be filtered to near perfect cleanliness in home filters that 
are affordable for the middle class.  Medical tourists now come to 
Indian cities for much less expensive and ‘world-class’ treatments.  
There are fewer cows and monkeys roaming in many parts of Delhi 
now.3  There are also fewer peacocks.  Karim’s, the famous Mughlai 
dhaba (restaurant) founded in 1913 near Jama Masjid in Old Delhi, 
has a video on its website that advertises (in English) its “state-of-the-
art infrastructure,” “well maintained supply chain,” and “extensive 
range of products,” as well as a menu that is primarily in Urdu and 
Hindi.4 
As is now trite to observe, urban areas in India defy neat 
classifications, both with regard to the activities that take place there, 
and the citizens living in them.  And yet, as the examples above 
illustrate, there have been some marked changes since the much-
discussed process of ‘economic liberalization’ began approximately 
three decades ago.5  The cited examples, while anecdotal, hint at 
changes on the grander scale of things.  While a complete picture of 
the massive political, economic, and societal transformations taking 
place is beyond encapsulation, studying the related phenomena of 
urbanization and capitalism can provide insights into the 
reconfigurations of everyday lives of citizens and therefore of 
society’s understandings of and engagements with larger 
undercurrents of change. 
The power of these forces—the urban and the capitalistic—in the 
Indian imaginary is most clearly observed in the rise of the new 
‘middle class’ in India.  The new ‘middle class’6 is both imagined in its 
                                                                                                                 
 3. That said, there are still an abundance of monkeys in some parts of Delhi. See 
Sean McLain & Aditi Malhotra, In Delhi, ‘Monkey Wallahs’ Ape Scary Simians to 
Spook Pesky Primates, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/for-
indian-wallahs-monkey-business-has-literal-meaning-1407119401. 
 4. Company Video, KARIM HOTELS PVT. LTD., http://www.karimhoteldelhi.com/
company-video.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. The term “middle class,” however, is a bit of a misnomer for the reasons 
Dasgupta and others have described—the population around whose interests the 
Indian economy is being restructured is less than ten percent of the overall 
population—making it more elite than the term “middle class” indicates.  However, 
as he notes, “many of those who [think] of themselves as ‘middle class’ [do] so 
because they identif[y] with the hard-working, socially constructive overtones of the 
phrase, and because they wish[] to differentiate themselves from another, even 
smaller, elite—far richer and more powerful than they . . . .” RANA DASGUPTA, 
CAPITAL: THE ERUPTION OF DELHI, at xii (2014).  Goldman Sachs, however, places 
the income threshold for “middle class” lower, and arrives at a figure closer to forty-
four percent as of 2010. GOLDMAN SACHS, INDIA REVISITED 3–4 (2010), 
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conglomeration of lifestyles, wealth, and upward mobility, and real in 
its ascension as a demographic.  As Goldman Sachs describes it, the 
middle class can be described as the emerging class of citizens, who 
drives “demand for personal items such as mobile phones, televisions, 
personal computers and autos, while also contributing to increased 
demand for infrastructure services such as electricity, transportation 
and banking.”7  It is defined by this emphasis on consumption—and 
in the case of the middle class that resides in cities—consumption 
packaged with ideas of technological and urban sophistication. 
With this turning of cities towards the middle class and their 
lifestyles, where are the urban poor in this sea of change?  And, more 
literally, where are they in the cities in which they reside?  As David 
Harvey and others have argued, the growth of urban slums8 is 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.goldmansachs.com/gsam/docs/instgeneral/general_materials/whitepaper/i
ndia_revisited.pdf. 
 7. See GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 6, at 3–4; see also Vinay Lal, Introduction to 
THE OXFORD ANTHOLOGY OF THE MODERN INDIAN CITY: THE CITY IN ITS 
PLENTITUDE, at xxix (Vinay Lal ed., 2013) [hereinafter THE OXFORD ANTHOLOGY]. 
 8. Regarding the word ‘slum,’ I would prefer a word with a less negative 
connotation, but as ‘slum’ is widely used in policy and law and amongst residences of 
such places, I will use it in this Article.  As for its definition, I rely on Liza Weinstein 
who describes slums as: 
[G]enerally substandard settlements in which large segments of the urban 
poor live and work throughout the global [S]outh. These settlements are 
typically informal, illegal, or quasi-legal and are supported by loose 
networks of residents, politicians, community leaders and crime bosses, 
social workers, police, and municipal officials. 
LIZA WEINSTEIN, THE DURABLE SLUM: DHARAVI AND THE RIGHT TO STAY PUT IN 
GLOBALIZING MUMBAI 10 (2014).  She also notes that: 
Athough the details of their emergence and transformations differ across 
political, cultural, and institutional space, slums can be broadly attributed to 
failures or gaps in formal service provision. When markets and governments 
both fail to provide adequate housing to low-wage workers and their 
families, then slums proliferate. 
Id.  In relation to slums in Delhi, I sometimes refer to them or their units by their 
local name (and the name that is used in various court opinions), ‘jhuggi-jhopris,’ 
abbreviated to ‘jhuggis.’  As Kalyani Menon-Sen and Gautam Bhan describe, slums 
cut across different kinds of informal and formal housing.  In their work documenting 
displacement in Delhi, they use the Government of Delhi typology that includes eight 
forms of settlements: jhuggi-jhopri clusters, slum designated areas, unauthorized 
colonies, jhuggi-jhopri resettlement clusters, rural villages, regularized colonies, 
urban villages, and planned colonies.  They note that under the Slum Improvement 
and Clearance Act 1956, slums are defined as “areas that are unfit in any respect for 
human habitation; and are ‘by reason of dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty 
arrangements and design of such buildings, narrowness or faulty arrangements of 
streets, lack of ventilation, light or sanitation facilities, or any combination of these 
factors detrimental to safety, health, or morals.’”  Under this definition, “[p]lanning 
and legality do not automatically imply the achievement of minimum standards.”  
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inseparable from urbanization and capitalism which bring increased 
employment opportunities but few spaces for low-wage workers to 
live.9  In the case of India, the inhabitants of the slums are often rural 
residents who have moved to cities in search of work, which may 
include construction work in the growing real estate industry.  The 
existence of employment, however, does not ensure health or shelter.  
As The Hindu, a leading Indian newspaper, recently reported, over 
half of Delhi lives in slums, without access to basic services.10  The 
contradictions in their lives of increasing access to some human rights 
and yet increasing insecurity with respect to their residences represent 
yet another challenge to telling a cohesive story of economic 
liberalization and societal reconfiguration. 
A central contention of this Article is that legal scholars, when 
faced with such large-scale constellations of socio-economic change 
and regulatory transformation, are prompted to widen their analytical 
and conceptual lenses in order to gain an adequate understanding of 
how different institutions, including governmental agencies and 
courts, operate in the midst of such change.  In order to understand 
the motivations behind particular policy decisions as well as court 
judgments, it becomes necessary to analyze them against the 
background of the alluded-to regulatory and political changes.  Such 
an analysis operates on two levels—the bottom-up study of court 
decisions on the one hand, and the encompassing discursive 
framework, which comprises official institutional announcements as 
well as rhetorical turns, on the other. 
In the case of India’s continuing economic and regulatory 
transformation11 we find a challenging example of large scale political 
transformation that, rhetorically, occurs through recurring references 
to the country’s (and its cities’) commitment to seemingly 
uncontested ‘values’ of modernity, development, and economic 
prosperity and, institutionally, appears to translate into concrete 
outcomes and socio-economic redistribution.  Studying, in particular, 
the way in which Indian courts have authorized the clearance of slum 
residences and other forms of precarious occupation, the goal of this 
Article becomes one of illuminating—but not overstating—the 
                                                                                                                 
KALYANI MENON-SEN & GAUTAM BHAN, SWEPT OFF THE MAP: SURVIVING EVICTION 
AND RESETTLEMENT IN DELHI 4 (2008). 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. 52 Per Cent of Delhi Lives in Slums Without Basic Services, THE HINDU, Dec. 
17, 2009, http://www.thehindu.com/news/52-per-cent-of-delhi-lives-in-slums-without-
basic-services/article66507.ece.  For an account of these phenomena in Mumbai, see 
WEINSTEIN, supra note 8. 
 11. See infra Part II. 
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connections between these judicial endorsements to ‘clean’ city 
centers of slums and other forms of delegitimized occupation and the 
large-scale, political rhetoric of modernity.  The challenge of 
embarking on such analysis lies in the method of placing the court 
decisions in question in this larger context without, at the same time, 
suggesting or resorting to simple causation patterns.  In other words, 
the point to be made is not one of a direct causal relationship between 
development policy and law, but rather of how the decisive arguments 
accepted by the courts must be seen against the background of this 
broader context.  And so when courts, in justifying slum clearance, 
make references to the importance of cities in India, for example, 
being ‘clean’ for tourists, or where courts give pride of place to the 
‘need’ to build ‘modern’ cities, we will see how they are, in effect, 
pronouncing and endorsing the at-the-moment omnipresent rhetoric 
of economic modernization and progress. 
By drawing closer together this often effusive realm of rhetorical 
policy clamor with the much more narrow scope of judicial reasoning, 
we will gain a clearer picture of how the marginalization of the urban 
poor has occurred through jurisprudence that draws its legitimacy, in 
part, from the pervasive discourse of neoliberalism, modernity, and 
development.12 
The focal points of urban land and its associated laws against their 
political-economic background are of particular salience for several 
reasons, each of which is further explored in this Article.  First, 
designations of appropriate urban uses of land are significant 
allocations of resources towards residents and users of land—in the 
cases explored here, this has meant allocations towards the middle 
class and their lifestyles.  Second, the construction of cityscapes has 
played an important role in the projection of modernity as a 
foundational part of national identity, and so understanding Delhi’s 
changing landscape is a key part of understanding the wider values at 
play in these transformations.  Lastly, through land use designations, 
the judiciary articulates priorities and values and operationalizes local 
governance objectives in ways that are seen to further or impede 
development.  And so, urban land use is a significant area in which 
current development orthodoxy plays out, and the judiciary plays an 
important role in how that happens.  The study of the forgoing 
concepts shows how, since economic liberalization, judgments of the 
Supreme Court of India and the Delhi High Court regarding slum 
residents have, though not by explicit political statement, furthered 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Each concept is more fully explained in Parts I and II. 
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forms of neoliberal urban development through the decisions that 
choose between competing claims to use urban land. 
The judicial re-allocations of urban space towards the middle class 
in the name of cleanliness, pride, or economic development have 
direct impact on the legal status of all rights associated with this 
space.  The narrow argument in this Article is that the 
disenfranchisement of certain populations from legitimate claims to 
cities and city centers is being operationalized legally through shifts in 
how urban space and its associated rights are being conceptualized 
and justified.  Rather than having to justify the new interpretation of 
entitlements against legal precedent though, our analysis will show 
how rights are being (re-)conceptualized and (re-)configured with 
reference to an overarching value justification that exists in political 
economic discourses, namely modernity.  The broader aim of the 
Article, therefore, is to show that legal scholars must engage with 
wider discourses—the political economy of development and the 
concepts of ‘modernity’ and ‘neoliberalism’—to understand what has 
informed the circumstances around which these shifts in judicial 
opinion take place.  Only by seeing the complex relationships among 
these discourses and their global alter-egos can we understand how 
they mutually constitute each other and work to exclude the poor 
from urban space in an apparently legal manner. 
This Article pursues this investigation in four steps.  Part I, 
concretizes and justifies why the Article develops its analysis of the 
tenuous interplay between ‘modernity’ and residential claims from 
the perspective of the courts.  Part II, in an attempt to sketch the 
historical-political context of the case law of interest here, offers a 
brief engagement with the concept of modernity in Indian political 
and economic thought.  The analysis locates modernity’s influence in 
the Constitutional framing of property rights, as it has evolved from 
the time following Independence (1947) to the (continuing) period of 
so-called ‘economic liberalization.’  This loose periodization will 
suggest the rhetorically powerful juxtaposition of ‘socialism’13 and (a 
neoliberal form of) ‘capitalism’14 as respectively characterizing the 
                                                                                                                 
 13. There is some debate regarding how to adequately label the particular forms 
that socialism took in India.  I rely on Pranab Bardhan’s formulation of socialism as 
“an economic system with a predominantly public (including co-operative) ownership 
of the main means of production and worker control over a large part of the social 
surplus.” Pranab Bardhan, Some Reflections on Premature Obituaries of Socialism, 
ECON. & POL. WKLY., Feb. 3, 1990, at 259. 
 14. As explained further in Part II, I argue that the particular form of capitalism 
that is in ascendancy in India embodies many of the facets of neoliberalism, as 
understood and referenced by the various policymakers and lawmakers in India.  
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past and present, as well as the much anticipated (successful) 
economic future of India. 
Part III shifts our attention to the micro level of analysis and zeroes 
in on judicial decisions regarding slum clearances in order to provide 
a more detailed account of how courts have repeatedly been able to 
justify the eviction and removal of slum residents without, in fact, 
overturning any precedent that had associated their ability to stay in 
such places to their fundamental rights.  The analysis begins with the 
seminal Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corp.15 decision in 1985, in 
which the Supreme Court of India held that the slum and pavement 
residents facing displacement had been entitled to procedural due 
process under Article 21’s Right to Life.16  As discussed in detail in 
this Part, the Court gave significant recognition to the historical and 
personal circumstances of those who live in such precarious 
residences.  Revisiting the decision more closely, the analysis shows 
how the Court’s respectful account of the poor and their use of urban 
space was reflective of the judges’ acknowledgement of the larger 
economic shifts that had occurred and the resulting socio-economic 
hardships for some populations.  By taking a closer look at the 
aftermath and more recent case law, however, the analysis shows not 
only how this conception of rights to urban space eventually 
narrowed, but also how the language and framing used in the later 
cases leave out the sociological and political-economic contexts that 
had played a huge role in Olga Tellis. 
Finally, Part IV deepens this scrutiny of the case law in question by 
revisiting the courts’ language in these cases through the lens of 
neoliberal capitalistic development.  It argues that the cases provide 
implicit and explicit signals to the interests of foreign investors 
through the rhetoric of strong property rights, disciplined cities and 
citizenry, and beautification of urban areas.  This Part also attempts 
to draw attention to alternative narratives and judicial articulations of 
non-neoliberal ideals that are found in only a minority of case law.  
Subsequent courts could draw upon such narratives should they 
choose to turn away from the current dominant jurisprudence 
regarding urban space. 
                                                                                                                 
Throughout this Article, I refer to these terms not assuming that they have precise 
meanings, but rather as referential points to the larger political-economic discourses 
and values referred to herein. 
 15. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp., (1985) 3 S.C.C. 545 (India). 
 16. As explained in Part III, infra, it is not that the case protected their right to 
stay absolutely, but rather their right to procedural due process in the case of 
clearance. 
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I.  DEBATING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN URBAN DEVELOPMENT: 
COURTS AS SITES OF ENGAGEMENT 
In this Part, we need to answer the question ‘why courts?’  In other 
words, this Part attempts to explain and justify how the close scrutiny 
of a number of seminal court decisions regarding slum clearance in 
Delhi may offer insights into the larger regulatory dynamics in India’s 
drive for modernity today.  Accordingly, we must begin with the 
question, what has been the role of the judiciary in this period of 
transition?  More accurately, what have been the roles of the various 
institutions in the judiciary in these transitions?  The main contention 
here, however, is that there is no single narrative that could 
reasonably and adequately reconcile the different interacting forces 
that shape judicial decision-making in this context.  Similarly, as we 
will see, there is no single narrative that offers a satisfactory 
explanation of the fact that India’s courts have, over the last three 
decades, provided a range of outcomes with respect to the poor.17 
Despite our realization of the impossibility of conceptualizing an 
all-encompassing narrative of the role of the Indian judiciary vis-à-vis 
the urban poor, we focus on a number of seminal court decisions that 
deal with the contested residence claims of slum occupants in Indian 
metropolitan centers with attention to Delhi in particular.  The 
analysis focuses on the situation of the poor in their residential 
occupation of urban space and situates it in the contexts of broader 
political economy transformations, marked by the pronounced 
commitment to the concepts and values of ‘development’ and 
‘modernity.’  In doing so, this inquiry engages—through the lens of 
the judicial role in urban land use and governance—with two 
discourses, one of which revolves around the political economy of 
development in India, and the other being driven by concepts of 
modernity and neoliberalism in urban development. 
This engagement with two complex discourses, each its own world 
of concepts, meanings, scholarship, and genealogies, through the lens 
of another (the judiciary) is full of risks and needs a particular 
justification.  A promising answer might be gained when we consider 
                                                                                                                 
 17. There are seminal cases in the last decade which further the right to health 
and other rights for the poor, which stand in intriguing contrast to the cases explored 
in this Article, which narrow their rights and decrease their access to resources. See, 
e.g., C.E.S.C. Ltd. v. Subhash Chandra Bose, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 573 (India) (regarding 
the right to health). See generally YAMINI JAISHANKAR & JEAN DRÈZE, RIGHT TO 
FOOD CAMPAIGN, SUPREME COURT ORDERS ON THE RIGHT TO FOOD: A TOOL FOR 
ACTION, available at http://www.righttofoodindia.org/data/scordersprimer.doc 
(regarding the right to food). 
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that a legal analysis of case law—especially case law that is marked by 
such a high degree of variance as the area here under scrutiny—
remains too internal to legal-institutional reasoning, too tied to claims 
of precedent, revision, or turn-around, as long as the context in which 
these cases are decided remains in the dark.  In other words, an 
understanding of how and why courts have, in a growing number of 
cases, turned away from a previous recognition of the rights of slum 
occupants to reside in the specified urban areas, can only emerge 
from acknowledging the operation of courts.  This acknowledgment 
occurs not only in a larger socio-economic and regulatory context, 
but—decisively—in a discursive one.  As a consequence, a main 
concern of the following analysis is to show that only through a 
contextual reading of the cases against the background of an 
omnipresent official discourse around the need for the country to 
adapt, to move ahead, and to embrace the values of an encompassing 
commitment to modernization can we hope to gain a better 
understanding of the meanings embedded in judicial rulings that 
authorize the clearance of slums.  In particular, when judges justify 
the (negative) effects on the homeless with references to a ‘modern’ 
India, or to the city being a ‘showpiece’ to foreigners,18 the challenges 
of critically investigating the interaction between large-scale 
rhetorical, political discourse and judicial argument become even 
more apparent. 
Each of these discourses has its own richness that both justifies and 
challenges engagement with it.  The political economy of 
development offers an important analytical framework to study the 
significance of allocations of access to land and property in the Indian 
discourses of economic development, as well to the very idea of 
democracy in India.19  The arcs that connect a liberal development of 
orthodoxy in India with global assertions of the alleged 
uncontestedness of the values of economic growth and development 
are essential to an appreciation of what has been prioritized and 
idealized with regard to the uses of land.  India’s continued—if, 
varied—experience with and agency in the design of development 
policies and priorities must be seen in a relation of mutual 
enhancement with global trends in development, a theme touched on 
throughout the Article and widely ascertained in the academic 
                                                                                                                 
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. See AKHIL GUPTA, POSTCOLONIAL DEVELOPMENTS: AGRICULTURE IN THE 
MAKING OF MODERN INDIA 36–37 (1998) (regarding the importance of modernity 
and development to the new post-colonial state). 
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literature.20  But, while it should be unsurprising to find that judges—
like other public actors—operate in a discursive context, it is much 
more difficult to adequately unpack the concrete ways in which 
societal and political discourse shapes or even influences judges’ 
behavior.  To be sure, part of the difficulty stems from the fact that 
any assessment of a ‘discourse,’ its main trajectories, and even its 
contentions, is itself an assertion of coherence and cohesiveness.  As 
we discuss in far greater detail in Part II of this Article, nothing could 
be further from the truth in the context of modernity discourses.  
They are marked by a striking diversity of assumptions as well as 
implicit and explicit idea formations regarding the material and ideal 
quality, scope, and aspirations of the concept.  Precisely because the 
idea of modernity escapes all attempts at a simple definition, it 
provides for an uncertain canvas on which to map the different stages 
of its development. 
Modernity’s transformation in India is entwined with the 
evolutions of development ideas and policies.  Particularly striking is 
the use of a periodized history of economic development in the 
various scholarly accounts drawn upon here.  Against the background 
of the preceding observations, it seems even obvious now how the 
histories of industrialization and economic liberalization can, at best, 
offer moving reference points, as they are told with constantly shifting 
reference points, ‘key moments,’ and variances in establishing a 
historical timeline.  With this in mind, our analysis nevertheless 
remains interested in the question of what different and, arguably, 
contested accounts of historical-political and socio-economic change 
can, at least in part, tell us about concurring changes in urban 
development, economic and political redistribution, and urban 
transformation.  In other words, we must remain interested in an 
analysis of urban change ‘in context’—that is, in a study of the 
reconfiguration of ways of urban life, through a myriad of regulatory 
interventions, which in turn have to be studied against the 
background of spatialized domestic and global discourses of the 
means and ends of ‘legitimate’ development and global economic 
growth. 
In an attempt to pick up the echoes and trace the reflections of 
these discourses in the intricacy of judicial holdings in cases that 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See, e.g., ATUL KOHLI, POVERTY AMID PLENTY IN THE NEW INDIA (2012); 
LLOYD I. RUDOLPH & SUSANNE HOEBER RUDOLPH, IN PURSUIT OF LAKSHMI: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INDIAN STATE (1987); UNDERSTANDING INDIA’S NEW 
POLITICAL ECONOMY: A GREAT TRANSFORMATION? (Sanjay Ruparelia et al. eds., 
2011). 
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involve slum clearance, our analysis focuses on references to 
‘modernity’ as potential reflections or utterances of an emerging 
embrace of neoliberalism on the part of the deciding judges.  Both 
‘modernity’ and ‘neoliberalism’ are notoriously capacious and 
represent shifting amalgams of meanings, and yet both are essential in 
any attempt to understand the drive behind India’s official 
commitment to development.  In the discussion that follows below, no 
effort is made to offer neat definitions of these concepts, but rather, 
the aim is to illuminate their discursive appearance both in official 
governmental language as well as the case law under investigation.  In 
doing so, the challenge here exists in adequately showing the rich 
heterogeneity and multi-disciplinary configurations of these ideas and 
how they have impacted the direction of judicial argument in the 
context of urban development.  What we are interested in, in other 
words, is drawing together the government’s often-polemical 
references to modernity and neoliberalism, and the engagement of 
these terms through the framework of rights, claims, and regulatory 
competence in judicial arguments. 
Finally, our immediate engagement here with these two discourses 
occurs through the lens of the judiciary’s role in urban land use, 
zoning, and the regulation of city space.  In the discussion of the cases 
below, this Article draws attention to the significant urban 
constituency living in precarious conditions and offer evidence as to 
how a range of different courts have in recent years narrowed the 
access of urban poor to space in city centers by ordering the clearance 
of slums and the scaling back of rehabilitation for slum residents.  
However, the argument is not simply that these courts adopt a 
deliberately detrimental position against the poor—rather, it seeks to 
understand how the narrowing of these constituencies’ rights and 
their increasing marginalization is accomplished and justified.  It is 
therefore through the very detailed engagement with the case law in 
question that we can see the relationships between judicial reasoning 
and the discursive dynamics constituted—in part—by the political 
economy of development and the argumentative-rhetorical pull of 
modernity and neoliberalism.  Learning from ‘law in context’ and ‘law 
and society’ scholars,21 we are sensitized to the fact that courts 
operate in a rich discursive realm of competing interests and 
pressures, and our task becomes one of how to unpack and illustrate 
these relationships.  More specifically, as the Indian courts seek to 
                                                                                                                 
 21. E.g., STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., LAW IN ACTION: A SOCIO-LEGAL READER 
(2007); see also Stewart Macaulay, The New Versus the Old Legal Realism: “Things 
Ain’t What They Used to Be”, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 365 (2005). 
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find a legitimate basis for their decisions in the context of 
contemporary urban modernization, this project seeks to further 
understand and articulate the dynamics that shape judicial argument, 
choices, and outcomes in these processes. 
The challenges here are also opportunities to offer a complexified 
account: to avoid constructing a conspiracy against the ‘court’ and 
instead recognize the multitudes of benches and judges,22 and times 
and places, that exist in the judiciary; and, to avoid attempting to 
define a direct causal relationship between court action and ideas in 
development, and instead articulate how the courts have contributed 
to and operated within the development project discursively and 
through material allocations of resources. 
II.  SITUATING MODERNITY AND PROPERTY IN POSTCOLONIAL 
URBAN INDIA, BRIEFLY 
This Part engages with concepts of modernity in order to sketch the 
background against which development discourses in India have 
unfolded from the early days of a socialist economy to the more 
recent turn towards capitalism.  The aim here is not to offer a neatly 
periodicized account of distinct stages in India’s economic 
development, but rather to see how varyingly implicit or explicit 
references to and underlying understandings of modernity can be 
traced to have informed and influenced successive discursive stages in 
development policy.  The insights which we should hope to gain in the 
following section concern the employment and appearance of 
‘modernity’ as an argumentative and rhetorical device, because it is 
here where we might then be able to more clearly discern the 
influence of such discourses on the courts’ reasoning. 
A. What is Meant by Modernity? 
Within the capacious, overarching concept of ‘modernity,’ there is 
a particular conception that comes to our attention when Indian 
courts use phrases like “building modern India” as a justification for 
slum clearance.  It is not the ‘modernity’ of modernization theory, 
although it links with development discourse and technology; nor is it 
some variant of aesthetic modernism,23 though it is at times 
                                                                                                                 
 22. For more on the structure and diversity of the bench system, see Anjana 
Agarwal et al., Interpreting the Constitution: Supreme Court Constitution Benches 
Since Independence, ECON. & POL. WKLY., Feb. 26, 2011, at 27. 
 23. See Jürgen Habermas, Modernity: An Unfinished Project, in HABERMAS AND 
THE UNFINISHED PROJECT OF MODERNITY: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL 
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overdetermined by notions of ‘beautification’ and then appears to 
engage space as surface more than as form and function.  Modernity, 
when used by courts, suggests a folk sense, unexamined in its 
provincialism because it does not need to be questioned, and, at the 
same time, aspiring to have a global sense, unexamined in its, again, 
obvious and self-explanatory universality, or, more critically, 
hegemony.  Modernity, employed as a justification device, embodies 
the sense of a cleaner (Schumpeterian) creative destruction: it can 
clear the ground and make room for the new as well as rescue 
(selected) parts of the old.24  But it also hangs in the air and yet 
dissipates when we try to grasp it: as the Indian economic historian 
and social theorist Dipesh Chakrabarty notes, though it might have 
“outlived its utility as a rigorous concept and is mostly of rhetorical 
value,” it is ubiquitous in everyday discussions of democracy and 
development.25  It is a discursive habit as much as a normative goal, 
perhaps at times an unthinking mantra, and adaptable to every 
aspiration of Indian society, policy, economics, or law.  Put another 
way, modernity is like what the post-colonial studies scholar, Gayatri 
Spivak, said of liberalism, “that which we cannot not want.”26 
Insofar as reference to ‘modernity’ or ‘modernization’ can be used 
to justify a wide range of policy orientations and societal fantasies, it 
is important to begin to at least acknowledge the rhetoric.  Such an 
acknowledgement has to shy away from an attempt to take on 
modernity in all its historical connotations and normative claims.  
Instead, we must try to examine its use, and the consequences of its 
use, in the language of the judgments that are under investigation 
here, especially where the material implications of this rhetoric on the 
lives of urban populaces, namely the justification of the removal of 
the poor through judicial opinion and urban development, are so 
palpable. 
The references to the value and significance of ‘modernity’ in India 
are reflective of multiple geographies, times, and encounters.  In 
particular, the Subaltern Studies historians such as Chakrabarty were 
instrumental in furthering a deeper understanding of the construction 
                                                                                                                 
DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY 38–55 (Maurizio Passerin d’Entrèves & Seyla Benhabib 
eds., 1996). 
 24. See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND 
DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950). 
 25. DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, HABITATIONS OF MODERNITY: ESSAYS IN THE WAKE 
OF SUBALTERN STUDIES, at xx (2002). 
 26. For the quote and an insightful discussion and application of it, see Wendy 
Brown, Suffering the Paradoxes of Rights, in LEFT LEGALISM / LEFT CRITIQUE 
(Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002) at 420–21. 
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of the term ‘modern’ against the perceived pre-modern.27  While 
recognizing the early roots of ‘modernity’ in Enlightenment and the 
faith in rationality and institutions,28 they seek to understand its 
formulations and uses in India during colonial times and after 
Independence.  In particular, Chakrabarty, with reference to the 
Indian historian Ramachandra Guha, discusses how one primary 
difference between the uses of the term in India (as opposed to in the 
West) is that modernity in the Indian sense “was not founded on an 
assumed death of the peasant.”29  It is this engagement with the 
peasant that Subaltern Studies seek to complicate; accordingly, Guha, 
Chakrabarty, and others worked to overturn the construction of the 
Indian peasant as non- or pre-modern (as contrasted with the 
purportedly modern elite nationalist leaders and leading classes).  
They highlighted the contradiction that existed at Independence 
between the propagation of a modernity that included rights of 
citizenship, a market economy, freedom of press, and rule of law, but 
that existed, at the same time, alongside domination and 
subordination—phenomena which clearly cut against the liberal 
principles meant to constitute modernity in the new India.30  This is 
the dark side of deeming some populations and some processes 
‘modern’—because it rests on the immediate constitution, therefore, 
of others as not so.  (The very term ‘modern’ necessitates that 
division—between new and old, desirable and not—as the term 
arguably first came into being for precisely the purpose of making 
such divisions.31)  The act of making that designation is a clear 
“gesture of the powerful”32 and has impacts on the daily lives of 
citizens when it is done in a legal setting, whether implicitly or 
explicitly. 
                                                                                                                 
 27. See, e.g., CHAKRABARTY, supra note 25, at xix. 
 28. See MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF 
ENLIGHTENMENT 3–42 (John Cumming trans., Herder & Herder 1972) (a critical 
account). 
 29. CHAKRABARTY, supra note 25, at 19 (noting that a peasant did not have to 
undergo a “historical mutation” into an industrial worker to become a political 
citizen-subject of the nation; the formal granting of rights of citizenship to the Indian 
peasant simply recognized the peasant’s already-political nature). 
 30. See, e.g., id. 
 31. See Habermas, supra note 23, at 39 (discussing the early history of the word 
‘modern’ as used to distinguish between the Christian present and the pagan and 
Roman past). 
 32. See CHAKRABARTY, supra note 25, at xix. 
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Others have described more pluralistic or alternative versions of 
modernity33 or tried to preserve it as a less unilateral, more value-
neutral term, arguing that that it was originally meant that way—in 
other words, as a ‘way of being,’ which in turn ostensibly could mean 
different things to different societies.34  For the purposes of this 
Article, our interest in ‘modernity’ emerges from the rhetorical-
strategic place that references to modernity occupy in the court 
decisions upholding slum clearances.  Our interest, then, is both 
analytical and normative.  When courts justify actions by claiming 
that they are in furtherance of ‘beautifying’ cities, or promoting 
certain middle-class ways of life, or when opinions highlight 
purported hygiene and morality of poor populations as justifications 
for their removal (as opposed to their assistance), the notions of 
‘modernity’ are everywhere.35 
B. The Right to Property, Modernity, and the Indian Economy 
in the Socialist Constitutional Moment and the Decades that 
Followed 
The goals of economic development and its methods have varied 
considerably through the decades: some focus on GDP, others on 
poverty, still others on rights, and while some seek to uplift classes of 
the population, others focus on enabling the individual to rise.  At the 
time of Indian Independence, the notion of development that 
prevailed was closely entwined with the larger political concept of 
modernity and a commitment to socialism.  In the Indian sense of 
modernity, democracy and development were essential—meaning 
that growth itself would have to include the poor.  The following 
section articulates these ideas further by focusing, in particular, on the 
role of property rights. 
1. Modernity in the New Indian Economy 
In Sunil Khilnani’s framing of “the idea of India,” he notes that 
India as a “creation of the modern world” has been shaped by 
“fundamental agencies and ideas of modernity” which he defines as 
                                                                                                                 
 33. See, e.g., ARJUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL 
DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION (1996). 
 34. See generally JEAN COMAROFF & JOHN L. COMAROFF, THEORY FROM THE 
SOUTH: OR, HOW EURO-AMERICA IS EVOLVING TOWARD AFRICA (2011). 
 35. See CHAKRABARTY, supra note 25, at xx (discussing how modernity comes 
into speech as an expression of moral value, that the rhetoric of the term may be a 
sign that it is never far from our thoughts, and arguing that “[w]e must, therefore, 
engage and reengage our ideas about modernity in a spirit of constant vigilance”). 
42  FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLII 
“European colonial expansion, the state, nationalism, democracy, 
[and] economic development . . . .”36  And so, modernity as a way of 
being for India at Independence, can be seen as a product of many 
histories, outlooks, and visions—the political ones being of particular 
salience.  As Khilnani explains, the bringing together of the vast 
diversity of the Indian population and communities into a “single 
political community was the wager of India’s modern, educated, 
urban elite”—a wager that was based on “the idea of India” that “had 
no single, clear definition” but rather accepted pluralistic and diverse 
versions of itself.37  Therefore, as both Mahatma Gandhi and 
Jawaharlal Nehru had seen, politics was at the heart of India’s 
passage to and experience of modernity because the creation of new 
India was a creation of a new democracy that would continue that 
diversity.38 
The new democracy was an unlikely one and against the grain 
because of its inequality of caste, its size, and the imperial state from 
which it had freed itself.39  The orientation of the ‘nationalist elite’ is 
significant—the universal suffrage and the debates in the Constituent 
Assembly (responsible for drafting the Constitution) demonstrate the 
commitment of the new leaders to bringing the entire population into 
the fold of the benefits of Independence.40  The intent was not to 
create a domestic version of the colonial structure of elite and 
exploitation, but to build an inclusive society, government, and 
economy.41 
With this mindset at Independence in mind, the close entwinement 
of modernity with a commitment to an egalitarian form of economic 
development becomes more apparent.  As Francine Frankel notes, 
modernity in India was seen by political leaders from the time of 
Independence to include economic development but also a sense of 
                                                                                                                 
 36. SUNIL KHILNANI, THE IDEA OF INDIA 5 (1997).  One can also see how closely 
‘modernity’ and ‘modernization’ could be here—the version of modernity that 
includes politics and economic development, in part informed by European 
experiences.  That said, in the experience of colonialism and then post-colonial 
formation of these ideas, both Europe and India imagined and informed each other’s 
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 37. See KHILNANI, supra note 36, at 5–6. 
 38. See id. at 9. 
 39. See id. at 9–10. 
 40. See generally GRANVILLE AUSTIN, WORKING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: 
A HISTORY OF THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE (2003). 
 41. See infra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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morality.42  Morality meant, in part, an awareness of the normatively 
undesirable effects of a ‘modern’ society and economy.43  Economic 
development, therefore, was conceived as growth with social 
welfare.44  This idea, woven into the unique democratic experiment, 
meant that growth in and of itself was not the single primary goal of 
development, but that elimination of inequality through social 
participation in the economy and distribution of its gains were 
prioritized.45  Development policies therefore included “ideological 
preferences for the establishment of an egalitarian, decentralized, and 
cooperative pattern in agriculture and the rapid expansion of public 
ownership in the basic industrial sector.”46 
That said, these ideas manifested themselves in vague policies that 
did not succeed in achieving egalitarian distribution.  Evidence of this 
failure of political will can be found in agricultural and industrial 
reforms, inadequate social welfare expenditure, and the paucity of 
poverty alleviation measures.47  The contrast of the ideals of inclusion 
and social welfare with the reality of the implementation of 
redistributive policies is important, as seen in its influence in the 
formulation of property rights in the Constitution described below.48 
In official discourse, the agrarian portions of society were seen as 
an important part of achieving and governing the process of 
development.  The rural village, which had played a key part in the 
national imagination during the Independence struggle as the site of 
Indian identity49 was to become “the primary unit of social 
organization.”50  As such, development policies, in theory, were 
meant to enable the Indian population to remain committed to 
agriculture and small scale (publicly owned) industry, but in a new 
way that conceived of villages as the “primary focus of economic and 
political development programs” and as part of an entire “social 
organism” and “political framework” as opposed to their previous 
                                                                                                                 
 42. See FRANCINE FRANKEL, INDIA’S POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1947–2004: THE 
GRADUAL REVOLUTION 13 (2005). 
 43. In Frankel’s telling, as an indirect result of Gandhi’s continuing focus on what 
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 45. See FRANKEL, supra note 42, at 8. 
 46. See id. at 18. 
 47. See KOHLI, supra note 20, at 82–85. 
 48. See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
 49. See FRANKEL, supra note 42, at 9–11. 
 50. See id. at 17. See generally, KHILNANI, supra note 36. 
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conception as autonomous units.51  Unfortunately, the government’s 
support of agriculture during that time was more rhetoric than reality, 
and these conceptions of prosperous villages and productive 
agriculture were not to materialize in any significant way.52 
One major obstacle on the way to achieve a more egalitarian, 
modern Indian agrarian society was that this vision was in direct 
tension with existing patterns of ownership.  At the time of 
Independence, ownership of rural land was heavily concentrated, and 
much of the rural population was landless and impoverished.  The 
newly independent state, then, had to find a way to enable equitable 
access to land ownership if it was to fulfill the Constitutional 
commitment to “equality of status and of opportunity.”53  However, 
this need for more egalitarian ownership conflicted with another 
social value at that time—the avoidance of further, violent 
revolutionary change.  Modernity and development were meant to be 
achieved without massive social upheaval.54  Preserving the existing 
landholdings of elites had been part of political compromises agreed 
on in order to ensure a broad base of support of the Independence 
movement and post-Independence policies.55  New leaders could not 
attack the entire social hierarchy at once, as it included many of their 
supporters who had been necessary during the struggle for 
Independence and would continue to be necessary in the midst of the 
establishment of a new government.  This meant political 
compromises—in particular with regard to property rights—so that 
landowners would not feel threatened by the new project of India.56 
2. Modern Property Rights and Land Reform 
When the Indian Constitution was written in 1950, the right to 
property was formulated similarly to how it is found in other liberal 
common law Constitutions, including the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, in that it ensured that property would not 
be taken except for a public purpose and with just compensation.57  
                                                                                                                 
 51. See FRANKEL, supra note 42, at 17. 
 52. See KOHLI, supra note 20, at 82–83. 
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 54. See FRANKEL, supra note 42, at 20. 
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 56. See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
 57. The original protection for property was found in two articles in the 
Constitution, Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31.  Article 19(1)(f) provided that all 
citizens have the right “to acquire, hold and dispose of property.” INDIA CONST. art. 
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This right was included in the “fundamental rights” section of the 
Constitution.  Not only did this constitutional endorsement add moral 
and rhetorical force to the legal protection of property rights, but the 
placement in the fundamental rights section of the Indian 
Constitution meant that claimants could now bring direct suit in the 
Supreme Court (without exhausting lower court remedies), having 
standing to claim compensation for denial of such rights by the 
government. 
However, the clash between those in pursuit of egalitarian land 
reform and the owning elite’s interests was seemingly unavoidable.  
This clash emerged as a tug-of-war between the Supreme Court and 
Parliament that lasted for nearly three decades, and manifested itself 
in a number of cases involving property.58  Throughout the 1950s, 60s, 
and 70s, various land reform laws were passed in state legislatures to 
redistribute land towards the landless.59  Elite landowners challenged 
these acts before the Supreme Court,60 but judicial review of these 
cases was complicated by Parliament’s passage of the First 
Amendment in 1951, which limited the scope of judicial review of 
certain land reform acts.61  Nevertheless, the land reform acts were 
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 59. See AUSTIN, supra note 40, at 67–122. 
 60. See id. at 90–92. 
 61. Parliament had amended the property provisions in the Constitution by 
inserting Articles 31A and 31B to limit judiciary review of land reform.  Article 31A 
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repeatedly brought before the Supreme Court, who in 1967 finally 
ruled in Golak Nath v. State of Punjab that Parliament could not 
amend the Constitution to take away or abridge fundamental rights 
(which included the amended version of property at that time).62  In 
response, Parliament passed the Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Fifth 
Constitutional Amendments, which restored its ability to amend any 
part of the Constitution and restricted the right to property.63  When 
those amendments came before the Supreme Court in 1973 in 
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, the Court grappled with how 
Parliament could empower itself to change the Constitution in an 
unhindered way if it was no longer empowered to change the 
fundamental rights section per Golak Nath.  It ruled that while 
Parliament could amend the Constitution, it could not destroy its 
“basic structure,” which included judicial review, democracy, 
federalism, secularism, and many of the fundamental rights.64 
This battle between the branches was interrupted by Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi’s Emergency—the suspension of civil liberties 
and general elections from June 1975 to March 1977: an event that 
would be a turning point for Indian politics and the role of the 
judiciary.65  As Nick Robinson has described, the Emergency 
“undercut the political legitimacy of Parliament and the executive, as 
well as their claims to constitutional supremacy.”66  As a result, the 
Supreme Court was able to “increase its governance role relatively 
unchallenged.”67  In apparent atonement for the dictatorial episode 
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that the Indian government had imposed on its people, the Indian 
judiciary moved towards a rights-based discourse in the 1980s 
emblemized in Olga Tellis and its reliance on an expanded 
interpretation of the right to life found in Article 21 of the Indian 
Constitution.68 
Robinson frames the Court’s activism and expansion of the right to 
life after the Emergency as follows: 
 [T]he Court largely justified these interventions [regarding 
alleviating poverty] on two grounds.  First, it interpreted an active 
role for itself under the Constitution’s vision for controlled social 
and economic revolution.  Second, the Court appealed to principles 
of civilization or good governance that necessitated and explained 
its interventions. 
 Through the Court’s right to life jurisprudence, it took on many 
details of governance, like ordering more stringent enforcement of 
traffic regulations or banning smoking in public places.  Indeed, the 
Court took on so many functions that its right to life jurisprudence 
came to encompass more than just protecting life, but also 
promoting good governance more broadly.69 
The expansive role of the Court in governance is an important 
undercurrent in the slum clearance cases, as we will see.  In effect, the 
Court has continued its activism and role in governance in many 
ways, though now with different sets of values than those embodied in 
the post Emergency moment described by Robinson. 
After the Emergency, in 1978, a newly elected populist-oriented 
Parliament weakened the right to property in order to facilitate these 
land reforms.70  The right to property was taken out of the 
fundamental rights section of the Constitution and amended to state 
merely that “[n]o person shall be deprived of his property save by 
authority of law.”71  As a result of the amendment, compensation for 
takings was no longer guaranteed, and claimants seeking 
compensation for government infringement of their property rights 
were now forced to base their suits on statutory law72 from 1978 
onward. 
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It is worth noting at this point that the primary motivation to 
weaken the Constitutional right to property—the facilitation of land 
reform—was driven by the need to benefit the poor.73  Given the 
centrality of agriculture in the Indian economy, the importance of 
land reform as a potential method of including the poor in the 
economy cannot be underestimated.  The political salience of 
agriculture was manifested in these reforms as well as other policy 
endeavors.  Throughout the 1970s, Indian policymakers supported the 
‘Green Revolution,’ the new agricultural strategy that included high 
yielding seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, electric power, equipment and 
irrigation techniques.74 
The Constitutional formulation of property rights, the decades of 
judicial review of land reforms, and the primacy of development in 
national discourse, entwined the politics of the Court with the 
governance of resource allocation in ways that continue today.  The 
next section explores the shifts in the economy towards the form of 
neoliberal capitalism that would underlie the shifting jurisprudence 
explored in Part III. 
3. Modernity Shifts from Socialism to Capitalism 
Unfortunately, the land reforms of the 1970s and 80s failed to 
produce the agriculture-led economic growth for which policy makers 
had hoped.75  Between 1970 and 1980, the economy grew at an 
                                                                                                                 
Resettlement Act, No. 30 of 2013, INDIA CODE (2013).  Though the land acquisition 
process was amended in 2013 to include ideas of consent and increased rehabilitation 
for the landless, the new government that took power in 2014 is seeking its 
amendment to draw back some of those provisions. See Highways, Tax, Land 
Acquisition: A Glance at Narendra Modi’s To-do List on Reforms, HINDUSTAN 
TIMES, May 19, 2014, http://www.hindustantimes.com/elections2014/the-big-story/a-
to-do-list-for-india-s-new-government/article1-1220685.aspx; see also Ketki Angre, 
Government Looks to Relax Some Provisions of Land Acquisition Act, NDTV (July 
16, 2014), http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/government-looks-to-relax-some-
provisions-of-land-acquisition-act-559254. 
 73. Unfortunately, currently the lack of provision of property in the fundamental 
rights section has arguably enabled the government to again redistribute land more 
recently—this time from rural citizen to corporation—in the name of ‘development.’  
For a more detailed account of this phenomenon, see generally Usha Ramanathan, A 
Word on Eminent Domain, in DISPLACED BY DEVELOPMENT: CONFRONTING 
MARGINALISATION AND GENDER INJUSTICE 133 (Lyla Mehta ed., 2009); Priya S. 
Gupta, The Peculiar Circumstances of Eminent Domain in India, 49 OSGOODE HALL 
L.J. 445 (2012); Namita Wahi, Land Acquisition, Development, and the Constitution, 
SEMINAR MAG., Feb. 2013, at 49; Suresh & Narrain, supra note 58, at 5. 
 74. FRANKEL, supra note 42, at 581–83. 
 75. Id. at 581–83. 
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average of three percent per year.76  The economy was primarily 
based on agriculture and state-led industry in electricity, railways, 
communication, machinery, and steel.77  The fruits of this meager 
growth were not redistributed effectively through land or other 
reforms.  The land that was redistributed more often than not went to 
the “lower gentry” rather than the daily tiller who remained 
landless.78  Without land, much of the population remained below 
poverty—in the 1970s “approximately 40 to 50 percent of the rural 
population, a minimum of 220 million people, were believed to be 
subsisting below the low poverty line,” determined the Indian 
Planning Commission.79 
With the frustration of failed dirigiste80 policies of the early 
decades of Independence and the overwhelming poverty, and the blot 
of Emergency behind, policymakers moved India away from socialism 
and state-led economic policy gave way to capitalistic policies 
throughout the 1980s.81  As Atul Kohli argues, the pro-business turn 
began with Indira Gandhi focusing on private industrialists in an 
effort to spur growth in the 1980s—a point that is often missed by 
scholars.82  She supported business not through extensive Washington 
Consensus-type deregulation,83 but rather through an active 
government, which included the reform of economic administration 
and the orientation of the government towards spending, control of 
labor,84 and support of capital.85  This support included the removing 
of license restrictions; allowing big business into previously privatized 
areas, such as power generation, and offering tax relief.86 
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After Indira Gandhi’s assassination, under her son Rajiv Gandhi, 
reforms increased in the second half of the 1980s.  Certain industries 
were de-licensed, corporate tax rates were lowered, and incentives 
were given to the development of technology, in particular the 
computer industry.87  State controls on the entry, expansion, and 
production of private business were eased.88  Gandhi strove to create 
a technocratic image of Congress (his political party) that would be 
distanced from the corruption and inefficiency of earlier eras as well 
as from socialism.89  According to Kohli, Gandhi had wanted to open 
India to trade and investment as part of this “liberalization” but was 
unable to do so in a significant way in the face of politically 
strengthened domestic business groups.90 
This momentum culminated in the 1991 reforms lead by then 
Finance Minister Manmohan Singh, who implemented significant 
reforms of economic liberalization.91  The reforms included a 
continuing and increase of the reforms under Rajiv Gandhi, including 
increased privatization of state-owned industries, tax concessions, and 
deregulation.92  However, the later reforms also included a significant 
move towards opening the economy to more international trade and 
capital—the currency was devalued, import quotas were dropped, 
tariffs came down, and a variety of restrictions on financial 
transactions were eased.93  The reforms throughout the 1990s also 
included—as Kohli phrases it—”a sharply pro-business” re-
orientation of industrial policy by further elimination of licensing 
requirements, relaxation of antitrust restrictions, and “some efforts to 
defang India’s well entrenched and activist labor movement.”94  As 
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Kohli goes on to note, these changes were interpreted by the private 
sector as “highly favorable to them.”95 
As a result of the market-based focus of the reforms described 
above, the engines of the economy moved from agriculture and 
industry to finance and service.  In 1980 agriculture was 38.6% of the 
GDP, industry was 24.2%, and service was 37.2%.96  The transition to 
capitalism and service is evidenced in the current GDP.  While 
agriculture and industry still form a considerable bulk of the GDP 
(17.4% and 25.8% respectively), service now accounts for 56.9% of 
the economy and is growing at a faster rate than both agriculture and 
industry.97  The service industry is largely dominated by the 
production of urban financial centers and service-oriented 
corporations (such as call centers).98 
The shift in economic policy and the messages it signaled has 
resulted in the rise of private capital as a powerful interest group and 
the gradual decrease in power of other interests that were against the 
initial reforms.99  After the unfolding of the capitalistic economy over 
the past few decades, the change of relationship between the state 
and private capital is apparent.  The state, as Kohli notes, cannot 
“afford to go against the interests of private capital” if they want to 
promote economic growth and now “needs to ensure the conditions 
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of the smooth functioning of the private sector” as it is the “main 
motor of capital accumulation.”100  A recent publication by the 
Ministry of External Affairs illustrates Kohli’s characterization of the 
role of government towards capital well.  In 2014, the Ministry, in 
cooperation with the worldwide consulting firm KPMG, released a 
report called India in Business: Preferred Investment Destination that 
highlighted not only the growing Indian economy, but the explicit 
support of the government in enabling private capital to invest and 
the relevant policy changes that have taken place to that effect.101  In 
particular, the report notes that the “objective” of India’s foreign 
direct investment (FDI) policy is “to invite and encourage FI [foreign 
investment] in India.”102  This explicit support can be seen in sharp 
contrast to the relatively closed borders just several decades ago.  The 
issuance of this report, its detailed information, accessible language, 
and sophisticated design speak volumes of a government oriented 
towards pleasing a global audience of investors.  This theme—the 
ways in which government has been implicitly and explicitly 
supportive of private capital through its policies and its articulation of 
values—is picked up again in the analysis of the judiciary in Part IV. 
The current form of capitalism that characterizes the Indian 
economy can been described as embodying a variety of the features of 
“neoliberalism.”  While the definition of “neoliberalism” might 
appear to be in the eye of the beholder, it is generally accepted that it 
is driven by various ideas that favor a focus on the so-called “free 
market” over the state in economic growth, free trade, the individual, 
strong property rights, and the non-interventionist state, and that it 
has been in ascendancy in development policies since the 1970s.103  
David Harvey highlights the insidious aspects of this “class project” 
by noting that “[m]asked by a lot of rhetoric about individual 
freedom, liberty, personal responsibility and the virtues of 
privatisation, the free market and free trade,” the project “legitimised 
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draconian policies designed to restore and consolidate capitalist class 
power.”104  While the form of neoliberalism found in India differs in 
some degree from other forms of neoliberalism found elsewhere (for 
example, in the fact that the State has not entirely receded and that 
deregulation has occurred in some but not all areas of the finance and 
the economy), the decades following economic liberalization 
nevertheless demonstrate significant moves towards many of its 
tenets as described above.  The salient results of these moves for the 
purpose of this project—inequality, urbanization, and the growth of 
slums—are discussed below.  Another feature, the increase of strong 
property rights, is discussed in Part IV. 
Unfortunately, while the reforms of economic liberalization have 
had a profound effect on the Indian economy in increasing the rates 
of growth, they have also increased inequality, as other literature has 
discussed at length.105  This has led to a perception that there are “two 
Indias, one shining and the other bleak . . . .”106  The dichotomy is 
meant to reflect the differences in living standards between the rich 
(or, as I would rephrase—middle class) and the poor.107  The 
existence of and dynamic between these two Indias plays out in 
particularly stark terms in urban settings, where spaces that used to 
accommodate a range of Indias are now being designated for the 
shining one, as explored in the next Part. 
The rise of this “shining” India is, of course, closely aligned with 
private capital and urbanization.108  As of 2012, sixty percent of 
economic activity was a result of urban residents.109  This has several 
implications.  First, places of residence have changed from rural to 
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urban.  Second, places of residence, consumption, and work have to 
be built, and real estate has become a significant outlet for domestic 
and international capital.110  Third, the middle class is now more 
closely associated with business, and has come to see their success as 
part of the pro-business story.111 
Moreover, the rise of slums is not separate from that of capitalism 
and urbanization.112  Tayyab Mahmud has eloquently discussed the 
various forces that render slums a product and facilitator of neoliberal 
global capitalism.  He notes that “urban slums are produced by three 
inter-linked and enduring features of capitalism that have been 
accentuated by neoliberalism . . . .”113  The first of these is 
“accumulation by dispossession,” David Harvey’s concept of how 
“markets always rely on non-market forces, particularly legal orders 
and extra-legality, to disproportionately allocate power and resources 
to owners of capital.”114  This concept, in particular the recognition of 
legal orders and the allocation of resources, is important for the 
discussion that follows in Parts III and IV.  “Accumulation by 
dispossession” is strengthened by and produces the second and third 
of the features to which Mahmud refers: the existence of a “reserve 
army of labor”—the presence of “populations separated from their 
non-capitalist means of subsistence but not integrated into the 
productive circuits of wage labor on a stable basis”115—and the 
“informal sector of the economy”—the places these populations go to 
live and work.116  The presence of these factors is massive.  As of 
2013, as Credit Suisse has calculated, over half of the GDP and ninety 
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percent of the total workforce is in the informal sector.117  Focusing 
on this inter-dependency of slums and neoliberal capitalism, it 
becomes clearer how the existences of “bleak India” within urban 
centers are constitutive the story of growth after economic 
liberalization. 
The first two Parts of this Article have discussed the theoretical 
engagements of the judiciary with economic forces (Part I), and then 
the transformation of the economy to a capitalistic, urbanized one 
(Part II).  We can now return to the judiciary—this time to study it as 
the specific site of articulation of values that reflect and reshape city 
spaces through the analysis of slum clearance cases, before exploring 
the neoliberal development of cities around these values. 
III.  URBANISM, THE EMERGENT MIDDLE CLASS, AND THE SLUM 
RESIDENT IN CASE LAW 
With the transitions described above—towards capitalism, an 
increasingly service-based economy, and cities as the places of 
economic productivity—the setting of popular imaginaries of India 
seems to have moved as well from the rural to the urban.118  This can 
be observed in fiction,119 narrative nonfiction,120 and film121 in their 
attempts to capture the spectacle of the urban with increasing 
fascination and detail.  Cities are revealing places to locate the 
current ways of being, the current versions of modernity in India.  
They are the places where the varied activities in any particular space 
are negotiated, accommodated, claimed, and re-claimed not just daily, 
but moment by moment.  A sidewalk may simultaneously serve as a 
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place to work, a place to sell things, a place to walk, a place to eat, or 
a place to rest.  This multiplicity of users and uses is exactly what is at 
risk when values such as certainty and formality become more 
powerful than those forces that previously tempered it—diversity and 
accommodation—and are sought to be codified in spatial structures, 
lifestyles, and the law.  In short, city spaces are where Indian 
democracy most dramatically plays out in ways that stretch and test 
the Indian versions of modernity and inclusion, and force it to 
prioritize the sharing of resources or the certainty of formality.  They 
are “dramatic scenes of Indian democracy: places where the idea of 
India is being disputed and defined anew.”122 
In these scenes of democracy, the judiciary plays various leading 
roles.  Through the history of development, the formulation of 
property rights by the judiciary has worked to allocate resources 
towards certain groups.  In the cases that follow, once again disputes 
as to the rights of citizens to use space come before the courts.  In 
these cases, the judiciary has to decide between competing claims of 
use and entitlement.  These claims are brought by a variety of 
claimants: NGOs and activists on behalf of slum residents,123 an 
environmental activist for waste management in Delhi, and residents 
nearby a slum.  In the courts’ implicit and explicit valuation of these 
claims, they redefine who has a legitimate claim to which space, and 
they show us how the judiciary continues to have a powerful influence 
on resources and the economy. 
This exploration reveals support for lifestyles of the new middle 
class as an underlying motif in these cases.  The ways of life alluded to 
in them are significant facets of the new modernity which, as we 
explore in the next Part, is characterized by disciplined and clean 
citizens and cities welcoming international capital and real estate 
investment.  Such investment directly sustains these lifestyles through 
the construction of high-end residences, corporate office towers, and 
new malls and shopping centers.124 
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Through their decisions, courts do more than apply law and decide 
cases, or even choose between claimants, rights, and their perceived 
interests.  Through their use of language, their framing of rights and 
narratives, holdings, and rulings, they can be seen as aiding in the 
construction of particularly legalized, but also—through the 
normative reference to the values of modernity which are portrayed 
as being at stake in these concrete cases—legitimized, urban uses of 
space.  But, the courts’ agency in constructing normativity goes 
beyond that because the rights of the individuals caught up in these 
decisions themselves become a matter of judicial intervention and 
construction.  When courts endorse the governing body’s rendering of 
a ‘modernist’ use of land, for example, they simultaneously legitimize 
particular ways of life and, by consequence, the subject associated 
with those lifestyles.  And so, a close look at land use jurisprudence 
reveals the legal processes through which other populations get 
dropped through the cracks of the economic structural shifts explored 
in Part II by being (implicitly) designated as outside of the project of 
modernity. 
From the recognition of the right to life of slum and pavement 
residents in Olga Tellis to the more recent cases which declared that 
such residents should have no rights to rehabilitation, the cases in this 
trajectory illustrate the shift in legitimacy regarding the use of urban 
space.  This Part situates this transition within these cases—in order 
to understand how slum residents are being further disenfranchised 
through legal discourse, and how deeply embedded such justifications 
are in the most recent formulations of modernity in legal, political, 
and economic discourse in India. 
A. Olga Tellis and the Narrative of History, Circumstances, and 
a Respect for Pluralistic Contributions to Urban Life 
The foundational case of modern treatment of slum residents is 
Olga Tellis, a Supreme Court case from 1985 in which pavement and 
slum residents in Bombay brought suit against the state and local 
government for their plans to remove them.125  They alleged, inter 
alia, that (1) the government removal of pavement and slum residents 
violated their right to life (enshrined in Article 21 of the Indian 
Constitution) by precluding access to their ability to earn livelihood, 
and (2) this removal would also violate a property claim regarding a 
right to occupy public land.126  The government claimed that the 
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residents did not have any rights to trespass public land and prevent 
free movement of pedestrians on sidewalks.127 
On the first claim, the Supreme Court found in favor of the 
pavement and slum residents, with certain qualifications.  They set 
certain conditions for the removal of slums sympathetic to slum 
residents, including that slums which had been in existence for more 
than twenty years and which had been “improved and developed” 
would not be removed unless the land on which they stand or the 
appurtenant land was required for public purposes, in which case, 
alternate sites or accommodation would be provided.128 
Regarding the second argument, that slum residents had a right to 
be on public property, the Court did not find for the residents, and 
stated that “no person has the right to encroach . . . on footpaths, 
pavements or any other person reserved or earmarked for a public 
purpose.”129  The language is unequivocal and indicated that such a 
person “becomes a trespasser.”130 
While Olga Tellis is groundbreaking, and a high point for those 
who are forced to live on pavement and in slums, it merits still further 
exploration, given the trajectories that have followed from it.  It is 
true that the Court’s ruling is more accommodating of the rights of 
pavement and slum residents than what might have been expected.  
The argument here, however, is that the significance of the decision 
lies in large part with the way that pavement and slum residents are 
respected as citizens and individuals (to some extent) and how 
legitimate uses of space are constructed.  Moreover, as explained 
below, the qualifications131 to the provision of alternative sites of 
residence left the law open for later reinterpretation and narrowing. 
Three narrative threads in the case reflect the Court’s recognition 
of the ways in which these populations were being left out of the 
benefits of development, while bearing the brunt of shifts in the 
economy as it moves towards privatized industrialization and service.  
These narrative themes are: (1) the historical and economic 
circumstances of their marginalization, (2) their intent to reside where 
they do, and (3) their contributions to urban life.  This respect for 
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their agency and the recognition of the role of the state and market in 
creating these circumstances and constraints on their ability to live 
with dignity all but disappear in the later opinions discussed below. 
1. History of Displacement 
An acknowledgement of how slum residents ended up in their 
living situations permeated the opinion and drove the ruling.  
Bombay and Delhi (like many other cities) do not have public or low 
cost housing.  Though such housing is provided for in various city 
plans, there has been no significant implementation of these 
provisions.132  The residents who live in slums and on pavements are 
often displaced rural populations who moved to the cities for better 
employment opportunities as the primary engines of the economy 
moved from rural to urban settings.  The common sequence of events 
which led to these slum residents living on the outskirts of legality was 
recognized in Olga Tellis: 
[O]ne of the main reasons of the emergence and growth of squatter-
settlements in big Metropolitan cities like Bombay, is the availability 
of job opportunities which are lacking in the rural sector.  The 
undisputed fact that even after eviction, the squatters return to the 
cities affords proof of that position . . . .  These facts constitute 
empirical evidence to justify the conclusion that persons in the 
position of petitioners live in slums and on pavements because they 
have small jobs to nurse in the city and there is nowhere else to live.  
Evidently they choose a pavement or slum in the vicinity of their 
place of work, the time otherwise taken in commuting and its cost 
being forbidding for their slender means.133 
Once these residents find themselves in slums and pavements, they 
often are subject to cycles of demolition and displacement in the 
name of development or, more recently, beautification.  
Rehabilitation and relocation for these residents is spotty and rarely 
delivered, if promised at all.134  This history of the economic shifts 
recognized here (and explored above in Part II) is relevant to 
understanding the limited choices of poor urban populations with 
respect to employment and residence.  This history is lost in 
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subsequent cases when the recognition of the context of how and why 
residents live on the streets or on other public land does not appear to 
be a factor in the courts’ decisions.  Once this history is not 
acknowledged, the logic of accommodation of their circumstances 
falls away.  Slum residences appear to be trespassers, occupying urban 
spaces for no clear reason except opportunism, and are then deemed 
undeserving of minimum welfare provisions. 
2. Intent and Circumstance 
After recognizing the prevalence of rural unemployment which 
compels many to move to the cities, the Court recognized that the 
petitioners had not intended to “‘commit an offence or intimidate or 
annoy any person,’ which is the gist of the offence of criminal trespass 
under Section 441 of the Penal Code.”135  Instead, the Court observed 
that:  
They manage to find a habitat in places which are mostly filthy or 
marshy, out of sheer helplessness.  It is not as if they have a free 
choice to exercise as to whether to commit an encroachment and if 
so, where. The encroachment committed by these persons are 
involuntary acts in the sense that they are not guided by choice.136 
By disavowing the petitioners of ‘intent’ to encroach, the Court 
prevents them from being found in criminal trespass.  This lack of 
criminalization is significant.  It rests on an understanding of how and 
why these populations are living on land that is not legally theirs to 
possess.  Moreover, it respects the resilience of the marginalized to 
survive through their own hard work and determination.  Living on 
pavement is not an ideal circumstance, nor is it conducive to a life 
with emotional or physical security or health.  And yet, these 
populations survive in such situations, and the Court, in avoiding 
criminalization, refrains from further de-humanizing them and their 
existences.  It is only through the recognition of the history and 
structural economic conditions that this characterization of a lack of 
intention to offend appears to be a natural conclusion.  And, when 
such history is left behind in subsequent opinions, the door is left 
open for criminalization, or at least illegitimacy, to reappear. 
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3. Recognition of Individuality and Contributions of this 
Population to Urban Life 
The Court also articulates respect for these citizens by building a 
record of facts based on their very high employment figures and 
skills.137  They also refer to several individuals, including a college 
graduate and a poet.138  This recognition of individuals both 
humanizes and builds respect for the agency of these populations in 
the audience—be it a legal or popular one.  These are not masses of 
indistinguishable poor, at least according to parts of the opinion.139 
That said, though, the valuation is primarily justified based on 
economic considerations regarding this population’s productivity, 
without regard to the communities they have formed which eviction 
would disrupt or their value simply as human beings.  In later 
opinions and in later times, the citizen-agent of economic productivity 
is no longer the general working citizen, but rather the urban middle 
class consumer.  As explained further in Part IV, once this shift 
happens, the slum resident is no longer seen as economically 
productive (despite their actual employment), and is considered to be 
a drag on the modern economy and beautified city. 
B. Olga Tellis’ Progeny Post Economic Liberalization 
Various cases interpreted Olga Tellis first faithfully140 and then 
increasingly narrowly, with fewer allowances of rehabilitation for the 
pavement or slum residents.141  This section explores three cases since 
economic liberalization that narrowed the abilities of the urban poor 
to stay in their residences or access alternative ones and the rhetoric 
used by courts in justifying this.  Reading later cases, the declining 
legacy of Olga Tellis becomes more apparent: these cases rely on each 
other and not on Olga Tellis in their endorsement of the attitude 
adopted towards the urban populations.  These opinions weave an 
account of the circumstances of populations that is tied up with 
conceptions of morality, hygiene, and modernity.  The impact that 
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this use of precedent has had on the rights position of the affected 
population could not have been more stark: not only did the change 
in the law lead to an illegalization142 of these populations’ existences 
in their accustomed-to urban spaces, but the characterization of these 
places in particularly conceptualized urban societies (both physical 
and existential) through specific language and historical framing 
made these legal shifts appear natural and desirable. 
The historical and socio-economic contexts of how these 
populations ended up in the slums that Olga Tellis acknowledged—
rural displacement and a need for employment—is not recognized in 
these cases.143  That history, if it had been told, might have included 
not only how these populations ended up in the spaces in which they 
resided, but also how the nature of the patronage-style relationship 
between elites and slum residents had changed in such a way that 
meant less accommodation and provision for the poor.144  The loss of 
recognition of the structural constraints of development is also 
indicative of a turn from analysis that acknowledges the past 
(displacement, employment, migration) to analysis that aspires 
towards a particular future.  In other words, the later cases are not 
without a temporal context—it is just that the direction of that 
temporality has changed.  The opinions no longer look back to what 
has happened to populations and land; they look forward to a modern 
future, and in doing so, draw out aspirations as to how a city (and 
citizens) should look in that time. 
Each of the three factors above—individuality, intent, and 
history—are discussed in the cases that follow.  The analysis below 
highlights how each of these cases is useful for revealing the loss of a 
particular factor: Almitra Patel145 for the loss of individuality and 
contribution; Pitam Pura146 for the loss of intent; and Okhla Factory 
Owners147 for the loss of history. 
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1. Almitra Patel, or the Loss of Individuality 
In 2000, after economic liberalization, the Supreme Court heard 
Almitra Patel v. Union of India, a case that would have large 
implications for slum and pavement residents.148  To understand the 
significance of this case in shifting the legality of residence, it must be 
studied both structurally: who the parties were, what the legal issue 
was, and what the ruling encompassed; as well as rhetorically and 
contextually: what the Court said in the written opinion and how they 
said it, what they did not say, and what the socio-economic conditions 
in Delhi were at the time.  Almitra Patel, an environmental activist, 
brought the case against the city of Delhi regarding the issue of waste 
management.149  Though the actual legal issue was Delhi’s failure to 
institute an effective waste management system, the Supreme Court, 
in the course of its analysis, drew slum populations into the scope of 
the situation in several ways, as explained below.  By the time they 
issued the ruling on sanitation and eradication of slums (discussed 
below), it appeared like a logical answer to the problems as they had 
been framed. 
The case is actually a consequence of the Court’s decision to review 
a number of directives it had issued several years before.150  Part of 
those directives included orders that certain cities would undertake 
comprehensive implementation of sanitation measures.151  Almitra 
Patel is where the Supreme Court and Delhi face off regarding the 
apparent noncompliance with this directive—in short, why the Delhi 
government has not been effective at “keeping the city clean.”152 
The Court begins by lamenting the fact that the “historic city” of 
Delhi is now “one of the most polluted cities in the world.”153  It 
discusses in detail the orders given to clean up which have not been 
followed, and the massive pollution, in particular with regards to solid 
waste.154  Through the process of holding the Delhi government 
accountable for the ‘unclean’ state of the city, the court explores why 
the Delhi government has failed in this regard.  In the course of this 
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explanation, the court draws slum populations into the ambit of 
blame for the massive pollution of the entire city.155  This results in a 
double condemnation of slum populations: first, for not being good 
workers or cleaning Delhi effectively; and second, for living on public 
land.  Each point is explored in turn below. 
In the Court’s account, the Delhi government’s ineffectiveness at 
alleviating or preventing pollution can be traced to its ineffectiveness 
in managing its own sanitation workforce: “[t]olerating filth, while not 
taking action against the lethargic and inefficient workforce for fear 
of annoying them, is un-understandable and impermissible.”156  The 
opinion does not explore in detail who this “lethargic and inefficient 
workforce” is.  It is possible that the Court meant middle-
management of the Delhi government.  That reading, however, is 
unlikely, as the Court also says that one of the local agencies alone 
employs approximately 40,000 people as ‘safai karamcharis’ 
(sanitation workers, as explained further below) who are expected to 
work for eight hours a day and that, as noted by amicus curiae, “the 
[unsanitary] conditions of different areas of Delhi does not in any way 
show that the requisite effort has been put in or the required time 
spent in cleaning operations which are supposed to be carried out by 
this large workforce” 157—observations which are clearly directed at 
the lowest workers, not the management.  Given the uncritical 
referral of the amicus brief, it appears when the Court refers to 
lethargy and inefficiency, the court means the actual workers—who 
are, in the unacknowledged reality, making their living in incredibly 
harsh and unsafe conditions. 
Despite characterizing them as part of the root of the problem, the 
Court leaves unexplained who these safai karamchari workers are.  
‘Safai karamchari’ means, literally, ‘cleanliness worker’ and generally 
refers to people engaged with the most hazardous and polluted 
sanitation tasks.  The term includes (but is not limited to) those 
engaged with ‘manual scavenging’—the practice of cleaning out dry 
latrines and sewage by hand.  These workers – some of whom are 
regularized (i.e., receive benefits from their employers) and many of 
whom are not (daily wage earners or contract labor)—are some of the 
most marginalized populations in the country.  They overwhelmingly 
come from lower castes communities and most of them are female.  
There have been numerous efforts (including from public authorities) 
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to document their inhumane treatment and to improve their 
conditions, but despite later legislation and cases in their favor, the 
employment of people to do such work remains a widespread and 
terrible problem.158 
In the Court’s account of why Delhi is not clean, not only are these 
workers drawn into the narrative for failing to do their jobs, but the 
slum areas where workers such as these often live are brought in as 
well.  This is a second condemnation of these populations—the Court 
first conflates them with land mafia: 
Large areas of public land, in this way, are usurped for private use 
free of cost.  It is difficult to believe that this can happen in the 
capital of the country without passive or active connivance of the 
land owning agencies and/or the municipal authorities.  The promise 
of free land, at the taxpayers’ cost, in place of a jhuggi,159 is a 
proposal which attracts more land grabbers.  Rewarding an 
encroacher on public land with free alternate site is like giving a 
reward to a pickpocket . . . . [M]ore and more slums are coming into 
existence.  Instead of ‘Slum Clearance’ there is ‘Slum Creation’ in 
Delhi. 160 
and then subsequently blames them for the increase in garbage and 
waste in the entire city: 
This in turn gives rise to domestic waste being strewn on open land 
in and around the slums. This can best be controlled at least, in the 
first instance, by preventing the growth of slums . . . .  It is the 
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garbage and solid waste generated by these slums which require to 
be dealt with most expeditiously and on the basis of priority.161 
In condemning the Delhi government, the Supreme Court 
condemns, even more harshly, the people whom they see as the 
beneficiaries of Delhi’s failures to protect public property.  The Court 
does not distinguish between those who profit from slums and those 
who end up residing there, despite the lack of options they face for 
housing.  The Court refers to slums as ‘good business’ for the land 
mafia who run them, but then uses this minority of people who 
benefit from opportunistic squatting and illegal rent to characterize 
entire populations in this way.  They do not tell the full story of slums 
with recognition of the many others who live in slums because of little 
alternative, and who are beholden to such slumlords as the only way 
of having a physical place to reside in the city. 
Telling the narrative in a way that causally connects these 
populations (in a de-individualized way) to the problem of waste and 
undeserving profiteering is powerful.  From there, the Court puts the 
first wedge between slum residents and rehabilitation.  The statement, 
“[r]ewarding an encroacher on public land with free alternate site is 
like giving a reward to a pickpocket,” has been cited in numerous 
subsequent cases and in the news.162   This declaration, despite being 
out of context given the narrow legal issue in the case, arrives after 
the narrative is presented, and is asserted uncritically and in apparent 
solution to the problem at hand. 
The Court might have issued a narrow opinion regarding an 
empirical analysis of the specific order and what measures Delhi 
government did take regarding sanitation and had not been 
implemented effectively.  However, it goes much beyond this and 
paints a clear picture of the dire situation—by narrating the Delhi 
government to be nearly completely ineffectual and the slum 
residents to be unjustly benefiting from, and polluting through the use 
                                                                                                                 
 161. Almitra Patel, 2 S.C.C. ¶ 14. 
 162. E.g., id.; A.A.Das v. Mohanty, (2014) WP(C) No. 11585, ¶ 8 (Orissa H.C.), 
available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/24175965/; Jagjit Singh v. Union of India 
(2010) WP(C) No. 2806-2934/2004, ¶ 21 (Delhi H.C.); Wazirpur Bartan Nirmata 
Sangh v. Union of India, (2003) 103 D.L.T. 654 (Delhi H.C.), available at 
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1927946/; Okhla Factory Owners’ Ass’n v. Gov’t of Nat’l 
Capital Territory of Delhi, (2002) 108 D.L.T. 517 (Delhi H.C.); Tripti Lahiri, The 
Ground Beneath Our Feet, TEHELKA MAG. (Dec. 12, 2009), http://www.tehelka.com/
the-ground-beneath-our-feet/?singlepage=1; Encroachments Cleared to Make Way 
for Drain, NEW INDIAN EXPRESS (May 25, 2014), http://www.newindianexpress.com/
states/odisha/Encroachments-Cleared-to-Make-Way-for-Drain/2014/05/25/
article2244541.ece. 
2014] JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTIONS IN INDIA 67 
of, space that is not theirs to use.163  Despite the fact that these slum 
populations (and their conditional right to rehabilitation) was not the 
issue of the case, the right to rehabilitation gets chipped away by the 
time the opinion is done. 
After this exposition regarding how migrants and slums are at fault, 
the Court ultimately directs the Delhi government to ensure that new 
“encroachments” are not created and that existing ones should be 
improved with regard to sanitation until they can be removed,164 to 
create adequate compost plants, and to appoint adequate numbers of 
magistrates to enforce laws in relation to litter, nuisance, sanitation, 
and public health.165  The case effectively intertwines issues of 
sanitation, slum populations, and law enforcement in the legal 
imagination—a combination which would then underlie later cases 
and rulings. 
2. Pitam Pura, or the Loss of Recognition of Circumstance 
Two years later, the Delhi High Court heard Pitam Pura Sudhar 
Samiti v. Union of India—the next case that moved urban slum 
populations even further away from occupying spaces in the city or 
even from rehabilitation on its edges.  In Pitam Pura, in keeping with 
common practice, the Delhi High Court combined multiple petitions 
with similar legal issues and issued an opinion meant to apply to all of 
them.166  The various petitions came with two sets of arguments and 
stances—the first, from residents of middle class colonies nearby to 
slums seeking eradication of slums, and the second, from residents of 
slums seeking government provisions or rehabilitation. 
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Behind Delhi’s Slum Demolitions, ECON. & POL. WKLY., May 17, 2008, at 57. 
 166. Pitam Pura Sudhar Samiti v. Union of India, (2002) I.L.R. 2 (Del.) 393, ¶ 1 
(Delhi H.C.). 
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In explaining the first set, the Court quoted from one of the 
petitions which detailed how the jhuggi cluster had come up in the 
previous three to four years, how they had caused many miseries on 
the residents, and how the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) had 
visited and ordered that the area should be cleaner.167  In order to be 
cleaner, according to the petition, the DDA declared that the area the 
slum residents were using to ease themselves was meant to be “green” 
and “beautiful” and that, therefore, the slum population should be 
“restricted” to the area outside of the green area, with latrine 
facilities.168  The quoted petition also stated that the DDA’s orders 
included that there should be four to five chowkidars (guards) to keep 
the area clean.169  It appears that these directions, however, were not 
implemented, and the resulting situation had given rise to these 
petitions. 
Applying the second set of petitions—those of the slum residents—
the Court referred to one petition that narrated the following: the 
lack of rural employment that led to their migration to cities; the fact 
that jhuggi populations such as this one comprised twenty-five 
percent of Delhi population; and how these populations supply a 
major portion of the work force—from manual jobs in both domestic 
and commercial fields to more skilled jobs in the industrial sectors—
in effect, “making a significant contribution to the economic life of 
the city.”170  The petition also alleged that the failure of the Municipal 
Corporation of Delhi (MCD) to eradicate poor drainage systems 
caused the contaminated water in their residences that attracted 
mosquitoes and created serious health consequences for the local 
populations.171  As the Court quoted, the petition also discussed how 
there have been numerous policy decisions to upgrade their slum, but 
that nothing ever transpired from them.172  Finally, the petitioner 
cited to Article 21 for the Right to Life, noting that it included the 
right of shelter and basic facilities to enable each citizen to live his life 
with minimum human dignity.173 
After laying out these petitions, the Court built another narrative 
for how Delhi has ended up with the huge housing shortage that 
resulted in this slum.  The turn away from the contextual narrative 
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 171. Id. ¶ 7. 
 172. Id. ¶¶ 7–10. 
 173. Id. ¶ 8. 
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given by the slum residents above is subtle at parts—the Court 
sympathized with those without housing when it noted “the misery of 
the homeless” in having to pay slum lords but ultimately conflated 
these populations and held the Delhi government responsible for 
failing to prevent the growth of slums.174 
In its exploration of the cause of the housing shortage, the Court 
first analyzed the history of the DDA—whose purpose was the 
“orderly development of the city.”175  The orderly development was 
meant to be accomplished through the various ‘Master Plans’ of Delhi 
through the decades, which developed lands, provided basic 
amenities, and built residential and commercial complexes, 
“according to needs and aspirations of people.”176  The Court then 
explored what has thwarted the accomplishment of these goals and 
finds that blame should be placed not only on the Delhi government 
who had failed at multiple points to prevent such “encroachments,”177 
but also on the “influx of people from all over the country” that has 
“posed [a] stupendous housing problem” resulting in “rampant 
construction activity, legal as well as illegal.”178 
The Court listed various types of illegal construction and stated 
that they were only concerned with jhuggis here.179  The court 
recognized that the “goal of every good administration is to have the 
capital city without slums,” and that this is a concern worldwide, but 
that “it is not necessary to address this issue in great detail.”180  With 
that, the court moved its analysis to the “slum lords,” whom it saw as 
profiting from the illegal construction.  Similar to Almitra Patel, the 
case furthers a certain story of who was benefiting from the slums.  
The Court spent significant energy on this point, including the 
following: 
                                                                                                                 
 174. Id. ¶ 19. 
 175. Id. ¶ 14. 
 176. Id. 
 177. After discussing the agencies’ civic duty to remove the jhuggis, it states: 
[I]t does not require any great intelligence to know that it is because of the 
negligence, carelessness or rather active connivance of the officials of these 
Departments as well as others, at the helm of affairs that these 
encroachments take place and slums are created.  In these petitions, itself, 
this Court passed Orders time and again to the effect that the concerned 
authorities including the Police Department shall ensure that no further 
Jhuggi/jhopri come up while the Court is considering these matters. 
Id. ¶ 18. 
 178. Id. ¶ 14.  The abridged nature of this history will be explored infra Part 
III.B.3. 
 179. Pitam Pura, I.L.R. 2 (Del.) ¶ 15. 
 180. Id. ¶¶ 16–17. 
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Countless slum lords who have cropped in public land are making 
large untaxed income every month out of the misery of the 
homeless.  No doubt, shelter for every citizen is an imperative of any 
good government, but there are cleaner ways to achieve that goal 
than converting public property into slum lords’ illegal estates.181 
Once the existence of the slums is framed as primarily benefiting 
‘slum lords,’ the only solution appears to be to demolish the slums.  
The Court opines that provision of shelter for the homeless cannot be 
in the form of these slums that benefit the slum lords—to do that 
would fail to distinguish “humanitarianism . . . from miscarriage of 
mercy.”182 
What should happen to these homeless citizens, however, is left for 
another day, as the Court explicitly stated that it will address the 
eradication of jhuggis but not their rehabilitation.  It did, however, 
close at least some doors to rehabilitation by ordering the demolition 
of slums not already protected by the Delhi government and the 
dismissal of petitions by the certain evicted populations, saying that 
the residents were “unauthorised occupants” living on 
“encroachments of public land” and therefore had “no legal right to 
maintain such a Petition.”183 
Once the slums are seen as the projects of slum lords, and parts of 
their populations lose the right to petition their removal, then the 
narrative of the second set petitions laid out above—regarding the 
history of how they got there, the importance of their economic 
contribution, the lack of implementation of plans by the MCD—
become moot points.  The orders of the Court, then, did not have to 
include provisions for the welfare of these residents, and it expanded 
on the framing of the illegality and illegitimacy of the poor to reside 
in their homes.184 
The order, which instructed the government to demolish slums that 
were not already specifically protected by government order, would 
have huge implications for further cases.  Here was the Delhi High 
                                                                                                                 
 181. Id. ¶ 19. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. ¶ 20. 
 184. Id. ¶ 18 (stating “[t]here is large scale encroachment of public land by the 
persons who come from other States and after encroaching upon public land, they 
construct Jhuggi/jhopri . . . . There is no denying the fact that no person has right to 
encroach public land. It also goes without saying that if there is such encroachment it 
is the statutory duty cast upon the civic authorities like. M.C.D., N.D.M.C., as well as 
the DDA to remove such encroachments, be it by the lower strata creating slums or 
by other residents who encroach public land and make unauthorised constructions of 
big buildings thereon.”) 
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Court, one of the most influential courts in India, citing Almitra Patel 
with approval and reinforcing the framing of the urban poor and the 
duty of the local government to clear them from their spaces. 
3. Okhla Factory Owners, or the Loss of History 
Later that year, the Delhi High Court took this stance on the 
illegality of slum residences a step further and did away with almost 
all rights to rehabilitation.  In Okhla Factory Owners’ Ass’n v. 
Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi,185 the Court 
again faced the situation of slum settlements on public land. In this 
case, the government had decided to develop land that it had 
acquired decades before from farmers. In constructing the history of 
the current situation, Justice Kaul’s opinion provided a detailed 
account of various regulations that should be followed in the event of 
removal of a population.186  It also detailed the history of the various 
resettlement policies and what the government provided to the 
populations.187  While the opinion discussed the failure of government 
plans to effectively upgrade or rehabilitate existing slums, it framed 
the problem as one of limited resources: there is not enough land in 
Delhi, according to the Court, to accommodate these populations.188 
Not unlike Pitam Pura, the Court blamed the migrants who came 
to Delhi every year in search of employment for the ‘proliferation’ of 
jhuggis/squatter settlements.189  And in the end, it went on to place 
blame for the health environment of the entire city on these slums, 
despite some recognition of the housing shortage: “[t]his [lack of low-
cost housing] has resulted in haphazard and unhygienic mushrooming 
of slums in the urban areas causing a lot of damage to the health 
environment of the city as a whole.”190 
Also like in Pitam Pura, the Court sympathized with the homeless 
by recognizing the paucity of low-cost housing but did not seem to 
take this sympathy into consideration in the ruling: the situation of 
the homeless might be unfortunate, but it did not make encroachment 
an option.  And so while the opinion did acknowledge: “[i]t has been 
stated that the slums are products of structural inequality in the socio-
economic development and that the authorities have been unable to 
                                                                                                                 
 185. Okhla Factory Owners’ Ass’n v. Gov’t of Nat’l Capital Territory of Delhi, 
(2002) 108 D.L.T. 517 (Delhi H.C.). 
 186. Id. ¶¶ 3–8. 
 187. Id. ¶¶ 4–22. 
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provide affordable . . . low cost housing,”191 it proceeded to do away 
with any measures that at least allow them to stay where they are.  
Finally, the Court recognized that while the Delhi government has 
“admit[ted] its responsibility to provide shelter,” it has also “stated 
that it has been unable to do so.”192 
Another missing part of the history is how the public land itself was 
taken from citizens in order to build the city.  The public entity tasked 
with the development of Delhi, the DDA, who owns much of the land 
on which slum residents reside in Delhi, obtained ownership of this 
land through displacing farmers and villages or taking over 
unoccupied land during the 1950s and 60s.  It acquired the land in the 
name of development for public purpose.193  The city plans at that 
point included affordable housing,194 but were never pursued 
adequately.  When the history of displacement for the public good is 
drawn upon, it is done to support the single view that the poor do not 
have any entitlement or should not have any expectation of 
accommodation.  In short, the court referred to this history of 
displacement to argue that it would not have been right to have taken 
from those farmers and to let the poor live there, ignoring the original 
plans which would have in fact accommodated them.195  Moreover, 
this neglects to consider that some communities who face eviction 
have been there for decades, and their expectation of some level of 
recognition by the local government is not baseless—some 
communities were accommodated by the local government with 
allocation for water, electricity, and other needs by formal and 
informal networks of patronage with the elite in ways that have 
broken down over the past few decades.196 
Once this history is left out, or told with the framing described 
above, there is no room to acknowledge the economic and social 
constraints within which these populations live—decreasing 
employment opportunities in the rural areas, lack of low cost housing 
                                                                                                                 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. ¶ 42. 
 194. See 1962 MASTER PLAN, supra note 132, at 5–6. 
 195. Okhla Factory Owners, 108 D.L.T. ¶ 42. 
 196. See Chatterjee, supra note 144, at 171–73, 176–77.  When part of the history of 
resettlement is presented in Okhla Factory Owners, it is in the terms of what the 
government provided, not how many were left out of this system, and how many 
more would be after their opinion. See Okhla Factory Owners, 108 D.L.T. 517. 
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in cities, the former expectations of on-site accommodations, or even 
the lack of servants’ quarters that used to be available.197 
In the face of this lack of provision for shelter or low cost housing 
for the migrants who come to Delhi for work, and the apparent 
shortage of land, this court then abolished any remaining right or 
expectation of rehabilitation.  The previous cases were important 
foundations for this ruling and are used to make this decision look 
like an application of the various precedents, rather than a further 
chipping away of rights.  It drew on Olga Tellis for its qualification on 
the rights of pavement and slum residents—that providing an 
alternative site for living is not a condition precedent for eviction.  It 
also quoted with approval the observation in Pitam Pura that 
humanitarianism must be separate from miscarriage of mercy when it 
discusses who benefits from the slums.198  This allowed the Court to 
conclude that: 
[T]he continuing existence of such a policy [of rehabilitation] serves 
no social purpose.  Such a policy without any social criteria, is illegal 
and arbitrary and we hereby proceed to quash the same which 
requires alternative sites to be provided to slum dwellers occupying 
public land before they can be removed from such public land.199 
The Court went on to direct the parties, inter alia, that while 
existing government orders should be abided by, “no allotment will 
be converted into ownership basis as is proposed by the Government 
of NCT of Delhi in its policy guidelines for implementation of the 
Scheme for relocation,” “[n]o alternative sites are to be provided in 
future for removal of persons who are squatting on public land,” and 
“[e]ncroachers and squatters on public land should be removed 
expeditiously without any pre-requisite requirement of providing 
them alternative sites before such encroachment is removed or 
cleared.”200  As Usha Ramanathan succinctly noted, the Court “shot 
down the resettlement policy of the state and, in doing so, absolved 
                                                                                                                 
 197. See DASGUPTA, supra note 6, at 362–70 (describing how upper level small 
terrace apartments that used to accommodate servants are now increasingly being 
rented out to young people choosing to move out of family homes).  While the 
evidence that Dasgupta offers is anecdotal, it fits my observations while living in 
Delhi as well, and is also supported by Chatterjee’s analysis of the breakdown of elite 
and poor systems of patronage. Chatterjee, supra note 144, at 171–73, 176–77. 
 198. Okhla Factory Owners, 108 D.L.T. ¶ 46. 
 199. Id. ¶ 47.  The Court also states that it will be “open” to the government to 
“devise a policy for rehabilitation of the economically weaker sections based on a 
legitimate criteria but the criteria cannot be encroachment on public land.” Id. 
 200. Id. ¶ 49. 
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the state of its obligation to assist the urban poor in accessing 
affordable housing.”201 
In sum, through this line of cases, the Supreme Court and the Delhi 
High Court moved slum residents from getting rehabilitation under 
certain circumstances to not having any such rights (outside of the 
recognition of particular fairly narrow government orders already in 
place before these judgments). 
IV.  THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
‘MODERN’ CITIES AND CITIZENS THROUGH SIGNALS TO PRIVATE 
INVESTORS 
“Besides, Delhi being the capital city of the country, is a show 
window to the world of our culture, heritage, traditions and way of 
life.  A city like Delhi must act as a catalyst for building modern 
India.”202 
 
Constructing cityscapes to create a national identity that impresses 
tourists and the rest of the world has been a facet of city planning for 
centuries.  Delhi, in particular, has an interesting history of whom it 
was meant to impress both internally and externally.  The city had 
been built over multiple times before the English re-planned and 
rebuilt parts of the governmental area in the 1900s.203  When they did 
so, they wanted it to “illustrate a rational modernity” and, according 
to the private secretary to King George V, “let the Indian ‘see for the 
first time the power of Western science, art and civilization.’”204  
Clearly, the power of architecture and urban planning to convey an 
identity, and in doing so, to intimidate, impress, and shape a 
population, are not new to Delhi.205 
In the present day, once again we can conduct a careful analysis of 
the judgments to find judicial support of the projects embodied in 
recent changes in urban landscapes.  The quote that began this Part 
and others found in judgments206 intertwine ideas of culture, national 
                                                                                                                 
 201. Ramanathan, supra note 141, at 3195. 
 202. Pitam Pura Sudhar Samiti v. Union of India, (2002) I.L.R. 2 (Del.) 393, ¶ 11 
(Delhi H.C.) (referring to the secretary of Urban Development). 
 203. See WILLIAM DALYRYMPLE, CITY OF DJINNS: A YEAR IN DELHI (2003). 
 204. KHILNANI, supra note 36, at 121. 
 205. For a fascinating architectural and sociological account of modern 
architecture and city planning in India, see generally, RAHUL MEHROTRA, 
ARCHITECTURE IN INDIA: SINCE 1990 (2011). 
 206. See, e.g., Almitra Patel v. Union of India, (2000) 2 S.C.C. 679 (India) (stating 
that the previous Court had tried to prevent “the capital of the biggest democracy in 
the world” from being “branded as being one of the most polluted cities in the world” 
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pride, and modernity with city identity and assessment through the 
gaze of foreigners.  The articulation of these in cases involving poor 
populations’ right to their residences links these projects and issues 
together.  It implicitly and explicitly justifies the clearance of slums 
for the ‘higher’ ideals listed. 
To understand the quote above and the context it operates in, one 
should consider who is looking through this show window—who is 
being impressed—and for what reason?  Specifically, the references in 
judgments to show pieces207 and show windows reveal the elevation of 
assessments of the rest of the world regarding matters of pride for 
Delhi.  The rebuilding and reconstructing and projection of 
modernity is about more than tourism or national pride.  As this 
section explores, at the time these cases were decided, economic 
policy in India was heavily directed towards the attraction of capital 
for various avenues, particularly FDI.  And, as we’ve seen throughout 
the political economic history of India, the courts in this moment as 
well are playing very tangible roles in paving the way for this kind of 
development. 
This part draws together the analysis presented in the previous 
Parts and places the slum clearance opinions in context of economic 
development in India.  First, it studies the increased role of 
investment in real estate in the economy.  It then explores the 
judiciary’s roles in sending affirming signals to capital through the 
rhetoric of strong property rights, a disciplined city and citizenry, and 
urban beautification.  Finally, we must consider whether there were 
alternatives to the emphasis on these particular signals—are there 
other discursive narratives that the courts could draw from with 
regards to the position of the poor in the economy and in cities?  In 
order to show the potential of possible narratives other than the 
dominant neoliberal one that has been explored in detail, several 
cases that treat slum residents in a more inclusionary way are 
investigated in hope that they will be drawn upon by courts more 
frequently in the future. 
                                                                                                                 
and that Delhi, as the capital of the country, should “be its show piece” so there 
should be more efforts to keep it clean); see also Jason Burke, Modi Launches Indian 
Clean-up Drive by Telling Officials: Get Sweeping, GUARDIAN, Oct. 2, 2014, 
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A. The Rise of Capital Investments in City Spaces 
The development of city space has been of particular interest to 
international capital during the past few decades—an interest that has 
been increasingly supported by government policies.208  In the 2012–
13 Industrial Report of the Department of Industry Policy and 
Promotion, the Indian government took care to show how its efforts 
to attract FDI have paid off—it cites reports from the United Nations 
Committee on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Japan Bank 
for International Cooperation, and Ernst & Young that all declare 
India to be one of the most attractive places in the world for FDI.209  
Indeed, total FDI flows have increased considerably in the 2000s and 
to-date:210 FDI has increased from approximately four to six million 
dollars per year in the financial years 2001 to 2005, to between thirty-
five and forty-seven million dollars per year in the financial years 
2008 to 2014.211  This is significant growth, occurring even during the 
Financial Crisis around the world.  More specifically, the 
“Construction and Development: Townships, Housing, and Built-up 
infrastructure” sector received the second-highest percentage of all 
FDI in 2012–2013, with eleven percent.212 
The focus on urban construction in particular is no surprise.  Urban 
development has been touted as the place to invest and for India to 
                                                                                                                 
 208. As reported by India Knowledge at Wharton in 2006, a number of U.S. 
investment banks, including Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, and 
Merrill Lynch invested in real estate. See Why U.S. Investors are Building Their 
Hopes on Indian Real Estate, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Oct. 31, 2006), 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/why-u-s-investors-are-building-their-
hopes-on-indian-real-estate/.  For the foundational argument regarding global cities 
as key spatial units and strategic territories of development, and the role of 
international capital in this transformation, see SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY: 
NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO  (2d ed., 2001).  
 209. UNCTAD ranked India as the third most attractive location for FDI, the 
Japan Bank for International Cooperation ranked India as the second most 
promising country for overseas business operations for medium-term and first as a 
long term investment destination, and Ernst & Young found India fourth as a global 
destination for FDI. DEP’T OF INDUS. POLICY & PROMOTION, MINISTRY OF 
COMMERCE & INDUS., ANNUAL REPORT: 2012-13 84 (2013), available at 
http://dipp.nic.in/English/Publications/Annual_Reports/AnnualReport_Eng_2012-
13.pdf. 
 210. The early increases in growth that India had after the 1991 reforms were not 
driven by large external borrowings or external capital flows. See FRANKEL, supra 
note 42, at 595. 
 211. See DEP’T OF INDUS. POLICY & PROMOTION, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE & 
INDUS., FACT SHEET ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 4 (2014), available at 
http://dipp.nic.in/English/Publications/FDI_Statistics/2014/india_FDI_May2014.pdf. 
 212. The service sector received the highest percentage of FDI, at eighteen 
percent. Id. at 8. 
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focus on for over a decade.  In a 705-page report in 2001 on strategies 
for growth, McKinsey Global Institute advocated for India to further 
liberalize their economy through various reforms.213  In particular, 
McKinsey pointed to “inflexible zoning, rent, and tenancy laws” that 
“‘freeze’ land in city centres that would otherwise be available for 
new retail outlets and retail.”214  Nine years later in 2010, the 
McKinsey Global Institute placed its faith squarely in the urban in a 
report titled: India’s Urban Awakening: Building Inclusive Cities, 
Sustaining Economic Growth.  The report discussed how “cities will 
be central to India’s economic future,” on account of the rapid 
urbanization and jobs.215  To meet this projected demand in Indian 
cities, massive construction would be needed—including “700–900 
million square meters of commercial and residential space . . . —or a 
new Chicago every year,” “2.5 billion square meters of roads,” and 
“7,400 kilometers of metros and subways” by 2030.216  Such projects 
were estimated to require $1.2 trillion of capital investment.  Large-
scale construction is already underway in many cities, including Delhi.  
In fact, real estate now constitutes nineteen percent of Delhi’s 
contribution to GDP.217  As noted in Part III, the new places of 
middle class consumption—residential high-rises, international-style 
malls, and offices—are all evidence of this exponential growth of 
industry. 
How, then, have cities and their planners furthered endeavors to 
attract foreigners and foreign capital?  As Swapna Guha-Banerjee 
notes, “[a]pparently the essential objective is to make these cities 
sufficiently investment friendly, acceptable to the credit rating 
agencies and help them emerge as geostrategic points to further 
neoliberalism in the Global South.”218  Cities such as Delhi are not 
passively having neoliberalism furthered through them.  Urban 
                                                                                                                 
 213. It also advocates for loosening of controls on FDI, removal of complex 
licensing requirements (deregulation), greater law enforcement, and privatization of 
electricity services. See generally BILL LEWIS ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., 
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plans219 and public-private partnerships show the cities’ willingness to 
develop their own spaces according to the needs of capital.  The next 
section explores the role of the courts in supporting the arrival of 
capital investments in cities. 
B. The Role of Courts in the ‘Frictionless Landing’220 of Capital 
Investments in City Spaces 
The language in the Pitam Pura quote that began this Part—a city’s 
need to act as a catalyst—recognizes the high burden of responsibility 
on the city in the attraction of international capital.  How does a court 
support this endeavor of modernity in the new neoliberal urban 
development paradigm—specifically, in the pursuit of international 
capital?  As the cases illustrate, by enabling the clearing out of city 
centers, by beautifying it for the visiting potential investors, tourists, 
and TV cameras, and by doing this all legally so that the ‘rule of law’ 
and ‘strong property rights’ remain unblemished.221  The very 
language that the courts use to describe these priorities strengthens 
the larger discourse of this singular vision of neoliberal urban 
development.  The route to beautification in the various cases is 
through the removal of slums and the shrinkage of space for certain 
populations—the removal apparently of un-modern ways of life in an 
effort to carry out the showing of “our . . . way of life” and “modern 
India” as noted in Pitam Pura.222 
And so, through the opinions explored above, the courts do not 
just rely on an outside legitimacy constituted by development 
discourse; they play a crucial role in constituting this discourse as well 
through a variety of ways.  Two themes are explored here: the 
support of capital investment in land (in line with neoliberal 
development), and the rewarding or disciplining of citizens according 
to their alignment with the new vision of modernity. 
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1. Signals to Investors 
These judgments and other recent ones have been characterized as 
direct support for corporate interests.223  In a 2009 article in the 
widely-read magazine Economic & Political Weekly, well-known 
human rights advocate Prashant Bhushan analyzed recent judgments 
by the Supreme Court that include sympathetic language to corporate 
interests and noted that “it is difficult not to get the feeling that 
court’s decisions were influenced by its own approval of the new 
polities of liberalisation, privatization and globalization.”224  Bhushan 
is in good company in this assessment with a member of the Court 
itself: in 2010, Justice Singhvi, then a justice of the Indian Supreme 
Court, lamented the “visible shift” in social welfare cases.225   In a 
judicial opinion, he stated that “attractive mantras of globalisation 
and liberalisation are fast becoming the raison d’etre of the judicial 
process . . . .”226 
The opinions studied here support the attraction of capital in 
several ways.  First, by espousing formality and the rhetoric of strong 
property rights, they reinforce what the World Bank and private 
financial actors need to feel confident to invest.227  Second, their 
orders to the city agencies and police to be more vigilant in enforcing 
the law and protecting property, and also making the city beautiful, 
indicate to would-be investors that property rights are protected and 
therefore more certain and that spaces are modern and clean 
physically.  That said, these chastisements of the city agencies can be 
read in more than one way—perhaps as keeping the cities in line with 
India’s broader commitment to development, or perhaps as part of 
larger themes in neoliberalism regarding reducing ineffectual 
government. 
a. Formality, Property Rights, and Rights of the Poor 
Protection of property rights is an important part of attracting 
investment (and of neoliberalism more generally).228  This protection 
                                                                                                                 
 223. In particular, Prashant Bhushan sees the post-economic liberalization 
Supreme Court as “solicitous towards large corporates.” Suresh & Narrain, supra 
note 58, at 11. See also Bhushan, Supreme Court, supra note 123. 
 224. See Bhushan, Supreme Court, supra note 123, at 1772. 
 225. Suresh & Narrain, supra note 58, at 11. 
 226. Id. (quoting Harjinder Singh v. Punjab Warehousing Corp., (2010) 3 S.C.C. 
192 (India)).  Justice Singhvi went on to observe that the courts are no longer 
listening to the plight of industrial and unorganized workers. Id. at 11–12. 
 227. See generally WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 221. 
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may include a number of features, such as adequate land records, 
clear title, and judicial enforcement of property rights, and can be 
seen as an underlying motif in the slum clearance cases.  In these 
cases, legitimate property rights and rights holders are constructed in 
contrast to what is perceived to be informal.  In short, these cases 
construct an ideal of “formal” property entitlements that deserve 
protection through several justifications.  Almitra Patel’s vilification 
of informality—of squatters, of informal labor (who often live in the 
kinds of slums they describe), and of informal work (which requires 
living nearby)—typifies the rhetorical valuing of the formal and the 
clean.  Pitam Pura’s casting of “residents” whose welfare and other 
rights under Article 21 cannot be “sacrificed,” in contrast to the “slum 
dwellers,” whose rights under Article 21 are not even acknowledged, 
again illustrates the intertwining of formality and entitlement to 
rights.229  Moreover, those in the middle class neighborhoods nearby 
are not asked to prove their formal rights to possession—they are 
assumed to have them, whereas those living on open land are not 
(despite the fact that much of Delhi property is “on the border of 
informality and legality”230).  In Okhla Factory Owners, this valuing 
of formality can be seen in the Court’s defense of Delhi’s right to its 
(expropriated) land.  Despite not having used it, despite the presence 
of marginalized populations who had come to depend on it, the right 
of the city to exercise use of land it had legally—however expansively 
this term is interpreted—made its own was deemed paramount.  And 
so we end up with a new constellation of property rights and 
governance, and as Upendra Baxi argued in 2006, “demolitions, 
which were once seen as excesses perpetrated during the Emergency, 
now come to be seen as the badges of good governance.”231 
This turn towards formality with regards to property and space 
renders even the human rights associated with clearance of slums, 
including the right to housing, hollow.  The emphasis on formality 
makes property-related rights rhetorical devices, used to justify 
further marginalizing the poor legally through creating contrasts 
                                                                                                                 
 229. Pitam Pura Sudhar Samiti v. Union of India, (2002) I.L.R. 2 (Del.) 393, ¶ 19 
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between them and the formal.  It also allows property rights to trump 
other rights (such as the right to dignity) in ways that are portrayed as 
being in society’s best interests.  Even when the rights of the poor in 
housing are respected in a formal sense, such rights lose their 
substantive meaning through their implementation.232  For example, 
calling upon one’s right to housing in the face of demolition often 
reveals an increased role of formality with regards to rehabilitation.   
There is more and more red tape for rehabilitation, and so even 
when relocation is offered (on the outskirts of the city), Delhi policies 
give strict licenses to inhabit the alternate housing.233  Residents do 
not get leaseholds or routes to ownership.  These residences cannot 
be alienated or rented out, and there does not appear to be any route 
to property for the residents.  Often, slum residents face problems 
proving that they have been in their homes long enough to qualify for 
rehabilitation.  Such housing is often in architectural forms that do 
not fit their living patterns or needs.234  Moreover, the location on the 
outskirts hampers their ability to get to employment, particularly for 
women.235  This mismatch of needs and housing—where perhaps 
‘shelter’ has been technically accommodated for, but at the expense 
of one’s participation in the city or one’s ability to conduct the life 
and livelihood that is fulfilling and sustainable—reveals the hollow 
nature of the purported fulfillment of these rights.  And, of course, 
these policies do not even begin to address the various attachments 
that people have to their homes (psychological, historical, use).  Nor 
do they account for the importance of community life, which is 
altered, if not destroyed, when people have to shift to other locations.   
How can such intangibles be accounted for in strictly formal 
interpretations of rights?  In other words, too narrow of an 
interpretation on what it means to fill an obligation to a ‘right to 
shelter’236 does not recognize any sort of broader, more existential 
right participate in or shape the city in which these residents live.237 
                                                                                                                 
 232. Balakrishnan Rajagopal characterizes the forms of socio-economic rights 
being promulgated more generally as pro human rights but anti-poor. Pro-Human 
Rights but Anti-Poor? A Critical Evaluation of the Indian Supreme Court from a 
Social Movement Perspective, 18 HUMAN RTS. REV. 157, 157 (2007). 
 233. See, e.g., MENON-SEN & BHAN, supra note 8, at 9–15, 36–43, 86–89. 
 234. See MEHROTRA, supra note 205 (discussing the small square footage, boxed in 
high rise apartments that are a far cry from the community life that people seek to 
have); see also CHARLES CORREA, Space as a Resource, in THE NEW LANDSCAPE 
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 235. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 236. While the Right to Housing language is broad and recognizes the emotional 
attachments to one’s home, the implementation and interpretation of it has been 
82  FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLII 
Even when rights for the marginalized were accommodated with 
more substance—such as in Olga Tellis—they were accommodated as 
an exception to the legitimate citizenry of a city who were (literally, 
walking) on the path of legitimacy.  It is not that, even in Olga Tellis, 
the residents of slums and pavement are recognized as part of a 
broader economic system of inclusive growth.  This view of them as 
an anomaly to the legitimate political economic system is reinforced 
and constituted by how they are seen in the legal discourses examined 
here. 
b. City Governance and Beautification 
In the slum clearance cases, the courts have not shied from 
chastising the city of Delhi.  They call upon the city government to 
protect their own property,238 keep the city clean,239 and follow 
through with its planning projects. 240  These attempts to keep cities 
‘in line’ can be read as signals of judicial support of re-making cities 
into places to which capital would respond well241—disciplined, 
property rights-enforcing, respectful of rule of law, and, of course, 
clean.  From these judgments, one is left with the impression that the 
courts are willing to be ‘tough’ on both cities and citizenry in order to 
get them to change their patterns.  Relatedly, the courts also mention 
that the police should be used to protect land from the slum 
residents—another strong reinforcement of discipline and 
lawfulness.242 
Along with beautification and keeping the city clean are the 
contrasts that are set up with relation to slum areas as unhygienic and 
unhealthy for the environment.  For example, as part of the 
justification for removal, the Court in Okhla Factory Owners 
lamented the “unhygienic mushrooming of slums” and attributed 
                                                                                                                 
limited at best. See generally, HOUS. & LAND RIGHTS NETWORK, THE HUMAN 
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 237. See HARVEY, supra note 104. 
 238. See generally Okhla Factory Owners’ Ass’n v. Gov’t of Nat’l Capital Territory 
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supra Part III). 
 240. See generally Okhla  Factory Owners, 108 D.L.T.; Pitam Pura Sudhar Samiti 
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 241. See discussion supra Part III. 
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“damage to the health environment of the city as a whole” to them.243  
This is an echo of Almitra Patel where the cleanliness and health of 
the entire city is seen to be at risk through the presence of slums.244  
Prashant Bhushan ties this kind of rhetoric to support of corporate 
interests.  He has argued that the emphasis on the environment has 
come to be used as a shield—the poor end up losing out in the face of 
justifications for clearance based on the environment.245  This is 
accomplished through the “right to a clean and healthy environment” 
being read into Article 21, which, as Bhushan notes, allows 
“individual benches of the court [to use] their own subjective 
understanding of what [is] needed for a healthy and clean 
environment.”246   This subjectivity, in recent years, has led to 
corporates getting more favorable treatment than the poor.247 
2. Shaping the Citizenry 
The support for middle class ways of life and the capital interests 
that build and benefit from these ways of life can be seen in the way 
in which certain populations benefit from the rulings, in the 
disciplining of the poor through the language of hygiene and 
sanitation, and in the references to law enforcement and 
beautification.  The cases above slowly cast slum residents as 
encroachers, associating them with ‘pickpockets’ and thieves, further 
confirming their illegitimacy and lack of right to exist in public space, 
even when they do not have access to private space.  This evolution 
can be seen through the cases: if the theme of Almitra Patel was the 
supposed unsanitary ways of life of slum residents, then in Pitam Pura 
it was whose rights should be respected (the ‘residents’ or the ‘slum 
dwellers’), and finally in Okhla Factory Owners it is who, in the face 
of scarce resources (land), should get priority (the productive middle 
class).  It must be noted that those who are given property rights are 
those who already live a more apparently legitimate existence—in 
better areas with higher property values, and in locations that enable 
them to be a part of urban consumerism in those spaces. 
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Similar to the construction of the peasant as “baffled by modern 
political and economic institutions,”248 the construction of the urban 
slum resident as baffled in the new world of technology or 
consumption does not hold up.  These poor are not alien to modern 
India—not only because they exist in the present day249 and live lives 
that depend on technology, capitalism, and political institutions 
implicated by modernity, but because these capitalistic ways of life of 
broader society depend on the urban poor for sustainability.  The 
urban poor populations construct and maintain the malls, homes, 
cars, roads, and other spaces that are celebrated as ‘modern.’  And so, 
the dark irony in Almitra Patel and the other cases chastising the 
poor for their hygiene and sanitation in the name of modernity is that 
(ignoring for a moment the prejudiced and false nature of these 
characterizations with regards to the residences of the poor), they are 
called upon to perform the very services that further the projects of 
modernity.  The disciplining of the poor through the appeal to 
sanitation or public health, however, is not unique to India or to this 
time period.250 
The Pitam Pura quote above that expressed hope that Delhi will be 
a catalyst was used to close the opinion—to provide the final 
justification for removing slum areas and to support beautification.  
The justification of tourism and a modern India is presented in an 
uncritical way.  The elevation of foreign gaze (or, in other parts of the 
opinion, that of middle class residents) is treated as a given.  This 
prioritization has huge effects for the poor.  If their gaze (or their 
provision) is not the focus, then they are disciplined into non-
interference with the middle class or the foreign experience of, or 
investment in, city life. 
The chipping away of rehabilitation and rights described above 
further decreases the government’s obligation to take even minimal 
responsibility for its citizens.  The distance from rights language and 
rights enforcement (which is used only in regards to the legitimate 
citizens) puts slum residents far from entitlement to anything 
property or resource related.  From there, they can only come to the 
government as beggars asking for handouts, rather than displaced 
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citizens with grievances.  If they are not entitled to anything, then 
‘giving’ them the minimum—shelter on the outskirts of the city, 
licenses to live there without route to ownership, and strict 
requirements for proving entitlement to these paltry measures—is 
considered charitable provision.  Indeed, the first line of Okhla 
Factory Owners saw rehabilitation as just that—benevolence—not 
the obligation of government: “Benevolence in administration is a 
necessity but this benevolence has to be balanced against the rights of 
the residents of a town specially when dealing with one commodity 
which can never increase which is land.”251 
Once the slum residents are not seen as residents with rights, and 
rehabilitation is merely benevolence, it is hardly surprising that such 
provisions could be done away with. 
C. Alternative Narratives in Judicial Opinions 
While many cases continue the line of reasoning and 
marginalization detailed above, there are two recent Delhi-based 
cases, which should be explored for the alternative account of law and 
circumstances that they present.252  Unfortunately for now, these 
potential alternative formulations appear to be just that, given their 
treatment by subsequent courts—alternatives too far outside of the 
mainstream orthodoxy regarding urban space and citizenry to change 
the tide.  However, while they remain minority judgments, their 
presence in jurisprudential discourse otherwise dominated by 
neoliberal tenets with regards to urban space should not be 
underestimated.  If and when change does happen, it is often through 
such threads of dissent being woven into larger efforts with adoption 
and adaptation.  Therefore, once again, the analysis in this section 
draws attention not only to the outcomes of the cases, but the rhetoric 
the judges employ and the contexts they recognize. 
In the first case, Sudama Singh v. Government of Delhi,253 Delhi 
High Court Chief Justice, Ajit Prakash Shah, contextualized the 
situation of the poor in Delhi by including a discussion of history and 
values.  He discussed the Delhi Master Plan, and paid particular 
attention to the urban poor and the provisions for their 
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rehabilitation.254  This discussion framed rehabilitation within 
economic development.  In words that recalled the inclusive ideals of 
development at Independence, he observed that “[t]he concept of 
land as a resource should be adopted to develop such accommodation 
with private sector participation and investment, to the extent 
possible.”255 
This attempted balancing is also evident in his treatment of Article 
21.  When addressing the petitioners’ claim that demolishing the 
slums without ensuring relocation is violation of their fundamental 
right to shelter enshrined in right to life under Article 21, he engaged 
in a lengthy discussion of the human right to shelter, and how these 
populations ended up living in slums.256  In his narrative, their intent 
and migration is attributed to the “pressure on agricultural land and 
lack of employment opportunities in the rural areas” and the large 
number of people who were “forced” to move to cities for the 
availability of employment opportunities in urban areas.257  He also 
recognized how the “lack of access to legitimate housing” within their 
means “compelled” them to live in slums.258 
Finally, he demonstrated respect for their resilience and 
participation in urban society by noting their varied livelihoods that 
included many based on daily wages, such as selling vegetables and 
other household items, as well as rickshaw pulling and several regular 
positions in “industrial units in the vicinity.”259  This discussion 
acknowledged that the women were employed as domestic help in 
nearby houses and that some children were employed as child labor 
and a few “fortunate [ones] . . . [went] to municipal schools in the 
vicinity.”260  It is worth noting that the proximity for work and 
education are vital to such populations, which he implicitly 
acknowledged. 
From this account of the situation and “precarious” existence of 
the poor, he was then able to declare that they are not to be treated as 
second-class citizens, and expressed concern at the “lack of basic 
amenities at the relocated site.”261  In the end, he found that “[a]s 
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long as they were not on an existing road,” they could not be denied 
the benefit of rehabilitation/relocation.262  He also situated this ruling 
in their right to life, stating that the “denial of the benefit of the 
rehabilitation to the petitioners violates their right to shelter 
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.”263   
While this represented a major victory for the slum residents, and 
an important check on the three cases above, the impact of this case 
as a matter of law is not clear—it has not been taken up by 
subsequent courts in the manner that Almitra Patel, Pitam Pura, or 
Okhla Factory Owners have.  It has only been cited by two cases: 
Jagjit Singh v. Union of India264 (unfavorably, by the same judge that 
presided over Okhla Factory Owners) and P.K. Koul v. Estate 
Officer,265 discussed below. 
In P.K. Koul, Delhi High Court Justice Gita Mittal presented an 
alternative narrative that existed before the post-2000 cases.  She 
quoted extensively from P.G. Gupta v. State of Gujarat266 and 
Chameli Singh v. State of U.P.267—Supreme Court cases which had 
held that shelter was a fundamental right.268  In P.G. Gupta, the Court 
held that “food, shelter and clothing are the minimal human rights” 
and that “the right to residence and settlement . . . is a ‘fundamental 
right under Article 19(1)(e) and it is a facet of inseparable meaningful 
right to life under Article 21’ of the Constitution of India.”269  And in 
Chameli Singh, the Court held that “the right to shelter is a 
fundamental right available to every citizen of India.”270 
Justice Mittal also drew from Chameli Singh to show the nature of 
the Right to Life, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, is not met 
merely by attending to “the animal needs of man,” but rather, “[i]t is 
secured only when he is assured of all facilities to develop himself and 
is freed from restrictions which inhibit his growth.”271  Justice Mittal 
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incorporated additional language from Chameli Singh that read “the 
right to food, water, decent environment, education, medical care and 
shelter” into the Right to Life, arguing that they are basic human 
rights and that the human rights enshrined in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and Convention and the Constitution 
of India “cannot be exercised without these basic human rights.”272  
With regard to shelter in particular, she recognizes the complexity of 
factors and the matters of dignity entwined in one’s living space by 
quoting the Supreme Court’s eloquent statement that: 
Shelter for a human being, therefore, is not a mere protection of his 
life and limb.  It is home where he has opportunities to grow 
physically, mentally, intellectually and spiritually.  Right to shelter, 
therefore, includes adequate living space and decent structures, 
clean and decent surroundings, sufficient light, pure air and water, 
electricity, sanitation and other civic amenities like roads etc. so as 
to have easy access to his daily avocation.  The right to shelter, 
therefore, does not mean a mere right to a roof over one’s head but 
right to all the infrastructure necessary to enable them to live and 
develop as a human being.  Right to shelter when used as an 
essential requisite to the right to live should be deemed to have been 
guaranteed as a fundamental right.273 
Finally, not unlike the Court in Olga Tellis, she recognized the 
history of this population and their displacement (in this case, from 
Kashmir).  In the end, she found for the displaced, but restricted the 
holding to situations where security is an issue.274 
This account, and its respectful language towards the poor and 
appreciation of the context of their residences, stands in marked 
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contrast to the other slum clearance cases explored herein.  
Unfortunately, this case, and this very comprehensive account of 
human rights and the right to shelter, has not currently been cited by 
any other judgment.  And so, the cases on record, which continue to 
inform recent decisions, remain the cases of illegality.275 
CONCLUSION 
This Article engages with the discourses of the political economy of 
development and the concepts of modernity and neoliberalism 
through the lens of the role of the judiciary in order to understand the 
context in which recent cases regarding the legality of slum residences 
have occurred. 
The contextualization of these judgments shows the constitution 
and reinforcement of norms of legitimacy and modernity in 
development discourse, policy, and judicial opinions.  More 
specifically, through this analysis the Article tries to show how, once 
modernity is taken to mean a collection of orientations which, in the 
context of urban development, includes neoliberalism, then the legal 
narrowing of rights of the poor to their residences appears to be a 
natural consequence.  Just as the eras of socialism lent a certain lens 
to how the poor were seen, the discrediting of those socialist policies 
and the turn towards capitalism have had their own effects on the 
characterization of the poor. 
The judgments focused on here might have been different—in 
rhetoric and in outcome—if the courts had had alternative narratives 
of an inclusive form of development or capitalism on which they 
could have relied.276  However, within the current orthodoxy, the hold 
of neoliberalism and the attraction of capital on popular discourse, 
policy, and the judiciary have meant that the claims of the middle 
class are more likely than not to win with regards to urban space.  
When claims of the urban poor do ‘win’ with regard to rehabilitation, 
they are either provided for in a formal but not substantive way, or 
they are seen as anomalies to the system of growth and 
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(India). 
 276. Thank you to Nick Robinson for discussion on this idea. 
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development—unfortunate accommodations that must be tolerated 
before continuing to move full speed ‘ahead.’ 
Without an alternative, inclusive, economic agenda, the judicial 
support for the political economic orthodoxy of neoliberal 
development has come at a frenetic pace.  In India’s quest to “be 
made worthy” of entrance into the global economy, the corporate 
sector has begun “to be seen to be the engine powering this journey 
into the hypermodern.”277  The judiciary’s part in this seems to be to 
support the engine of development and modernity by supporting what 
is seen to be the path accepted by policymakers—corporate and 
investment growth. 
If an alternative existed in mainstream Indian policy discourse (or 
if courts chose to go against mainstream discourse more often), the 
judiciary might have had legitimate ways to acknowledge and respect 
the poor and to include them as full urban citizens with rights.  In that 
event, judgments that included the rights of the poor would not have 
been seen as a benevolence or charity; they would be seen in a 
context where such rights furthered a political economic vision in 
which the urban poor would have a role. 
The task remains to craft alternative narratives to neoliberal 
development and capitalism that do not fall prey to the same traps 
that socialism did.  The role of the judiciary and of the articulations of 
values and legitimacy in their opinions are not to be underestimated 
in the project of re-crafting.  Through the designation of rights and 
the framing of history, political-economy, and the humanity of the 
people who come before it, the courts play a huge part in reinforcing 
or shifting what is seen as legitimate—legitimate actions on the part 
of the government, the middle class, and the poor; legitimate laws and 
government responsibility; and, as specifically explored here, 
legitimate uses of space and resources in urban areas. 
                                                                                                                 
 277. See Aditya Nigam, Embedded Judiciary: Or the Judicial State of Exception?, 
in THE SHIFTING SCALES OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT IN NEO-LIBERAL INDIA 
22, 33 (Mayur Suresh & Siddharth Narrain eds., 2014) (referencing Upendra Baxi). 
